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Law and Finance in the Chinese
Shadow Banking System
Dan Awrey†
Almost twenty years after economists Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-
de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny published their ground-
breaking and controversial research examining the relationship between
investor protection laws and stock market development, our understanding
of the relationship between law and finance is still in its theoretical
infancy.  Today, few would argue that strong laws do not help generate
credible commitments and thereby promote financial development.  Ulti-
mately, however, this observation is little more than a useful starting point
for exploring the complex, dynamic, and structurally interdependent rela-
tionship between law and finance within modern financial markets.
So where might we turn for further insights into this important rela-
tionship?  One potentially useful framework is the ‘Legal Theory of
Finance’ (LTF).  At the heart of LTF are four interwoven propositions.
These propositions emphasize the legal construction of financial markets,
their essential hybridity and inherent hierarchy, and the role of the law as
not only a mechanism for generating credible commitments, but also as a
potential source of financial instability.  LTF thus both complements and
expands upon conventional frameworks for understanding the relationship
between law and finance.
This Article uses LTF to explore the emergence, growth, and risks
residing within a little known but increasingly important segment of the
Chinese shadow banking system: the $USD2 trillion dollar market for
wealth management products (WMPs).  WMPs possess a number of dis-
tinctive legal and economic features.  First, despite being marketed by
banks and other intermediaries as substitutes for conventional deposit
accounts, the liabilities generated by the majority of these products do not
reside on bank balance sheets.  Second, while WMPs typically lock-in
investors’ capital for relatively short periods of time, this capital is often
invested into less liquid, longer-term assets.  The resulting maturity and
liquidity mismatches thus recreate the fragile capital structure of banks.
Third, WMPs have emerged largely in response to China’s interventionist
approach toward both banking regulation and broader macroeconomic
policy.
† Associate Professor of Law and Finance, Oxford University and Fellow, Linacre
College, Oxford.  The author would like to thank John Armour, Katharina Pistor, Alan
Morrison and Kristin van Zwieten for their extremely helpful comments on earlier drafts
of this Article.  The author would also like to acknowledge the financial support of the
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As we shall see, LTF holds out a number of important insights into the
emergence of WMPs, their legal structure, their dramatic growth in the
wake of the financial crisis, and the risks they may pose to financial stabil-
ity.  More broadly, understanding WMPs through the lens of LTF highlights
the fact that, far from simply representing the ‘rules of the game,’ the law is
also often the board, the game pieces, and the dice.
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Introduction
Amongst the many forgotten treasures on display at the New York Pub-
lic Library is the Hunt-Lenox Globe.  Dating from the early fifteenth cen-
tury, the globe is one of the earliest surviving cartographic representations
that includes a depiction of The New World.1  Equally significant, however,
is a small notation on the other side of the globe.  There, scribbled over a
patch of terra firma barely recognizable as the southeast coast of modern
day China, appear the words “hc svnt dracones”.2  Many believe that this
phrase was used by the cartographer to warn explorers of dangerous or
uncharted territories.3  Loosely translated from the original Latin, it
1. See Benjamin Franklin de Costa, “The Lenox Globe” (1879), 3 MAGAZINE OF
AMERICAN HISTORY 529, available at http://www.rockvillepress.com/TIERRA/TEXTS/
DECOSTA.HTM.
2. Id.
3. It is often thought that the phrase “Here Be Dragons” –  along with depictions of
dragons or sea monsters –  was widely used on medieval maps as a means of identifying
such territories.  In reality, the Hunt-Lenox Globe is the only surviving medieval carto-
graphic representation that actually bears this phrase. See Inhuman Geography: Here
There Be Dragons, U.C. SANTA BARBARA DEP’T OF GEOGRAPHY (July 7, 2011), http://
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declares simply: Here Be Dragons.
Over 500 years later, there is still a great deal we do not know about
China.  Today, however, our most pressing objective is not to map the con-
tours of the country’s mountain ranges, rivers, or coastline, but those of its
vast, complex, and constantly evolving financial system.  At the apex of this
system is the Chinese government and its labyrinthine network of wholly
and partially state-owned enterprises (SOEs).4  These SOEs include five
state-owned commercial banks.5  Together, these five institutions have a
market capitalization of approximately RMB4.3 trillion ($USD700 billion)
and represent almost half of the total assets within the Chinese banking
system.6  Residing beneath these state-owned behemoths are then a hand-
ful of smaller joint-stock commercial banks and foreign banking subsidiar-
ies.7  Collectively, these privately-owned financial institutions account for
approximately one-fifth of total banking assets.8  At the periphery of the
Chinese banking system, meanwhile, exists a vast network of over 3,000
city commercial banks, village and township banks, rural commercial
banks, rural cooperative banks, and rural credit cooperatives.9
The Chinese financial system is also home to a large and vibrant
shadow banking system.  Very broadly speaking, the term ‘shadow bank-
ing’ refers to financial markets and institutions that perform credit, matur-
ity, or liquidity transformation outside the formal banking system.10  In
China, this system includes a diverse range of financial products, trust and
guarantee companies, brokerage firms, cooperative associations, pawn
www.geog.ucsb.edu/events/department-news/891/inhuman-geography-here-there-be-
dragons/.
4. See MICHAEL F. MARTIN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CHINA’S BANKING SYSTEM: ISSUES
FOR CONGRESS 1– 2 (2012).
5. Id. at 3.  The banks were previously state-owned, but have since been trans-
formed into joint-stock companies with various shareholder categories. Id. Although in
theory the banks are operating as commercial banks, the majority of shares in four of
the five banks are non-tradable shares held by government entities. Id.
6. Id. at 7.  By way of comparison, the five largest commercial banks in the U.S.—
Wells Fargo, JP Morgan, Citigroup, Bank of America, and US Bancorp— had an aggregate
market capitalization of approximately $USD725.1 billion as of April 30, 2013. See The
World’s Largest Banks and Banking Groups by Market Cap (as of March 2013), BANK-
SDAILY.COM, http://www.banksdaily.com/topbanks/World/2013.html.  Combined with
wholly state-owned ‘policy banks’, these state-owned institutions account for approxi-
mately 55% of total banking assets. MARTIN, supra note 4, at 7.  For further information
about the ownership structure and governance of these state-owned institutions, see
infra Section IV(a).
7. See MARTIN, supra note 4, at 5.
8. Annual Report, CHINA BANKING REGULATORY COMMISSION (2011) at 119 [hereinaf-
ter CBRC Annual Report].  For further information, see infra Section IV(a).
9. As described in Section IV(a), these smaller banks and cooperatives are subject
to varying degrees of state ownership and political influence. See MARTIN, supra note 4,
at 4, 7.
10. See Zoltan Pozsar et al., Shadow Banking, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK
STAFF REPORT NO. 458 (February 2012), available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/
research/staff_reports/sr458.pdf.  The utility and potential limits of this definition are
examined in Section IV.
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shops, and informal lenders.11  Given its heterogeneity and relative opac-
ity, it is difficult to measure the size of the Chinese shadow banking system
with any certainty.  Recent estimates range from $USD2.2 trillion to
$USD4.8 trillion.12  What is clear, however, is that this system has grown
rapidly in the wake of the recent global financial crisis.13
This Article explores the emergence, growth, and latent risks residing
within a little known but increasingly important segment of the Chinese
shadow banking system: the market for so-called ‘Licai’ or wealth manage-
ment products (WMPs).  WMPs are collective investment schemes that
effectively serve as higher yielding substitutes for the time deposits and
other savings products traditionally offered by Chinese banks.14  The first
WMP was introduced in 2004.15  It was not until after the crisis— and the
RMB4 trillion ($USD652 billion) stimulus package introduced by the Chi-
nese government in November 2008— that these markets emerged as an
important vehicle for savings and investment, however.16  Between January
2009 and May 2013, the total volume of WMPs issued and outstanding
grew from just over RMB2 trillion ($USD328 billion) to approximately
RMB13 trillion ($USD2.12 trillion).17  To put this figure into perspective,
$USD2.12 trillion is equivalent to approximately 16% of total bank depos-
its in China, or almost 22% of total deposits in the U.S.18  WMPs thus
represent a significant and expanding segment of the Chinese financial
system.
WMPs possess a number of distinctive legal and economic features.
First, despite being marketed by banks and other intermediaries as substi-
tutes for conventional deposits, the liabilities generated by the majority of
these products do not technically reside on bank balance sheets.  Second,
while WMPs typically lock-in investor capital for a relatively short period
of time, this capital is often channeled into less liquid, longer-term assets
such as loans to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), local govern-
ment financing vehicles (LGFVs), private equity, and commercial real
11. See Cindy Li, Shadow Banking in China: Expanding Scale, Evolving Structure, FED-
ERAL RESERVE BANK OF SAN FRANCISCO 2, 4 (2013), http://www.frbsf.org/banking-super
vision/publications/asia-focus/2013/april/shadow-banking-china-scale-structure/asia-
focus-shadow-banking-in-china.pdf.
12. Id. at 1.
13. See id. For a more detailed discussion of the growth of the Chinese shadow bank-
ing system in the wake of the crisis is discussed in greater detail, see infra Section IV.
14. See Li, supra note 11, at 2.
15. Nicholas Borst, Shadow Deposits in the United States and China, CHINA ECON.
WATCH (April 4, 2013, 9:48 AM), http://blogs.piie.com/china/?p=2390.
16. See Li, supra note 11, at 1.
17. General Comment, Chinese Banks: Issuance of Wealth Management Products
Moderates, FITCH RATINGS (June 10, 2013), available at http://www.institutionalinvestor
china.com/arfy/uploads/soft/130617/32320_0922082021.pdf. [hereinafter FITCH
RATINGS].
18. Id. In September 2013, total deposit liabilities in commercial banks in the
United States equaled 9.6 trillion dollars, seasonally adjusted.  Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System, Selected Assets and Liabilities of Commercial Banks in the
United States as of November 2013, H.8, 3 (Nov. 7, 2014), available at www.federal
reserve.gov/releases/h8.pdf.
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estate.19  The resulting maturity and liquidity mismatches thus recreate the
fragile capital structure of banks.20  Third, and perhaps most importantly
for the purposes of this Article, WMPs have emerged largely in response to
China’s interventionist approach towards both banking regulation and
broader macroeconomic policy.
Like all explorers, we need a good map.  Articulated somewhat more
formally, we need a theory to help us better understand how the law and
regulation have shaped the emergence, growth, and structure of WMPs.
Conventional ‘law and finance’ scholarship has struggled to reconcile the
dominance of China’s state-owned banks, its relatively weak investor pro-
tection laws, and its underdeveloped stock markets with its impressive
track record of economic growth.21  More broadly and importantly, this
scholarship suffers from a number of manifest blind spots.  These blind
spots stem from the scholarship’s reductionist view of the law and legal
institutions, its failure to acknowledge the endogenous role of both the law
and politics in shaping patterns of ownership and financial development,
and its almost complete disregard for the relationship between the law,
financial instability, and financial crises.  Collectively, these blind spots
render this scholarship a relatively anemic framework for exploring the
relationship between law and finance within the Chinese shadow banking
system.
Other scholars, including perhaps most notably Franklin Allen, have
argued that the emergence of the Chinese shadow banking system is at
least partially attributable to the use of relationship and reputation-based
enforcement mechanisms as substitutes for strong laws and legal institu-
tions.22  Indeed, this argument has considerable traction within many of
the more informal segments of the Chinese shadow banking system.  Intui-
tively, however, we would expect such extra-legal enforcement mechanisms
to play a far less important role in connection with financial instruments
such as WMPs, which are typically documented in legally enforceable con-
tracts and issued by financial institutions licensed and supervised by pub-
lic regulatory authorities.23  Like conventional law and finance
scholarship, therefore, frameworks based on these mechanisms are
unlikely to provide us with a compelling explanation for the existence of
WMPs, the determinants of their legal structure, or the risks this structure
may pose to, inter alia, financial stability.24
19. See Li, supra note 11, at 2.
20. For a discussion of the fragile capital structure of banks, see generally Douglas
W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity (1983), 91
J. POL. ECON. 401 (1983); Douglas W. Diamond & Raghuram G.  Rajan, Liquidity, Credit
Creation and Financial Fragility: A Theory of Banking (2001), 109 J. POL. ECON. 287
(2001);
21. See generally Franklin Allen et al., Law, Finance and Economic Growth in China,
77 J. FIN. ECON. 57, 57 (2005).
22. Id.
23. See Li, supra note 11, at 3.
24. Reputation-based enforcement mechanisms may, however, actually play a curi-
ous and potentially important role within the market for WMPs. See infra Section V.
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So where do we turn when the conventional frameworks for under-
standing the relationship between law and finance seem unlikely to yield
meaningful insights?  One potentially useful framework is what Katharina
Pistor and others have labeled the ‘Legal Theory of Finance’ (LTF).25  LTF
focuses on the dynamic, interdependent relationship between public regu-
lation, private contracts, and the structure of the financial system.26  Per-
haps most importantly, it highlights how law and regulation spur
contractual innovation, how this innovation changes the structure of finan-
cial markets and institutions, and, ultimately, how these evolving struc-
tures may be vulnerable to potential instability.  LTF thus both
complements and significantly expands upon the conventional frameworks
for analyzing the relationship between law and finance, which focus prima-
rily on how strong laws and legal institutions help market participants
make credible commitments, thereby influencing patterns of ownership
and financial development.27  As we shall see, LTF is thus able to provide
us with a unique and valuable perspective on the important role of the law
and regulation in shaping the emergence, growth, and potential risks of
WMPs.
This Article is structured as follows.  Section I begins by examining
conventional law and finance scholarship and identifying its principal
shortcomings as a framework for exploring the complex, structurally inter-
dependent interactions between law and finance.  Section II advances LTF
as a complimentary theoretical framework.  At the heart of this framework
are four interwoven propositions.  These propositions emphasize the legal
construction of financial markets, their essential hybridity and inherent hier-
archy, and the role of the law as a potential source of financial instability.
Shifting focus from theory to practice, Section III describes the structure
and regulation of the Chinese banking system, along with the origins, basic
mechanics, and legal structure of WMPs.  Utilizing LTF, Section IV then
examines how the legal structure of WMPs has developed as a private con-
tractual response to certain restrictive features of the regulatory regime
governing Chinese banks.  This section also examines how this legal struc-
ture effectively recreates the fragile capital structure of banks, while simul-
taneously circumventing the capital, liquidity, and other regulatory
requirements that are typically employed to mitigate the attendant risks to
both institutional and broader financial stability created by that structure.
Lastly, this section examines whether and how this potential instability is
likely to manifest itself in light of the essential hybridity and inherent hier-
archy of both the market for WMPs and the Chinese banking system.  Sec-
tion V briefly canvasses some of the policy implications that flow from this
25. See generally Katharina Pistor, A Legal Theory of Finance, 41 J. COMP. ECON. 315
(2013).
26. Id. at 315– 16.
27. Pistor, supra note 25, at 326. The conventional frameworks also focus, con-
versely, on how weak laws and legal institutions spur the emergence of institutional and
extra-legal substitutes. See infra Section II for further discussion.
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exploration of the relationship between law and finance in the Chinese
shadow banking system.
I. Law and Finance: The Conventional “Reductionist” View
In its quest to emulate the logical formalism, rigorous empiricism, and
hypothesis testing of physics and other ‘hard’ sciences, mainstream (neo-
classical) economics has long attempted to build theories which abstract
from the complexities of the real world.28  These complexities typically
include the decision-making processes of individuals, firms, and other eco-
nomic actors, along with the diverse range of conditions under which these
decisions are made.  Importantly, these complexities also often include
both the law itself and the political, historical, and cultural contexts in
which the law is made and in which it evolves over time.  In effect, neo-
classical methodologies have come to demand that any variables that are
not susceptible to relatively precise measurement be either replaced with
more abstract and cooperative proxies or simply removed from the equa-
tion.  As a result, the defining feature of neo-classical economics has argua-
bly become its seemingly relentless focus on making predictions about
how rational, autonomous, utility-maximizing actors will behave given a
specific set of highly stylized legal and other parameters.29  Yet, insofar as
these parameters do not reflect the contours of the real world, it is not
entirely unrealistic to suggest, as Roman Frydman and Michael Goldberg
have, that neo-classical economics is best understood as a normative the-
ory about how economic actors and institutions should work, as opposed to
a positive theory about how they actually do— and sometimes don’t— work
in practice.30
All this is not to suggest that neo-classical economics has not contrib-
uted greatly to our understanding of the economic world.  What it does do,
however, is highlight the necessity and importance of theoretical choices
and the inherent dangers of excluding important explanatory variables.  It
was none other than Milton Friedman who suggested that these choices are
what ultimately demarcate the thin line between the “crackpot” and the
“scientist.”31  From Friedman’s positivist perspective, however, the exclu-
sion of important explanatory variables was essentially unproblematic so
long as the relevant theory possessed strong predictive power.  Following
this logic, the best theories are those that generate the most accurate pre-
28. For a discussion of this trend, see generally Geoffrey Hodgson, Observations on
the Legal Theory of Finance, 41 J. COMP. ECON. 331 (2013).
29. For an example of this approach, see generally Oliver Hart and Sanford Gross-
man, Disclosure Laws and Takeover Bids, 35 J. FIN. 323, 323– 34 (1980).
30. ROMAN FRYDMAN AND MICHAEL D. GOLDBERG, BEYOND MECHANICAL MARKETS: ASSET
PRICE SWINGS, RISK AND THE ROLE OF THE STATE 95– 96 (2011). See also Katharina Pistor,
Regulatory Implications of Financial Theories 2 (on file with author).
31. See MILTON FRIEDMAN, The Methodology of Positive Economics, in ESSAYS IN POSITIVE
ECONOMICS 3, 25 (1953).  For a critique of Friedman’s positivist methodology, see Dieter
Helm, Predictions and Causes: A Comparison of Friedman and Hicks on Method, in 36 OX.
ECON. PAPERS 118 (1984).
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dictions on the basis of the fewest number of independent variables.32  On
the surface, this logic seems virtually unassailable.  Inevitably, however,
theories based on this logic are vulnerable to changes in the underlying
causal dynamics and interdependencies between different (and potentially
excluded) variables.  In many cases, understanding these dynamics and
interdependencies is of clear theoretical and practical importance.  Put sim-
ply, if a variable such as the law is both important and non-static, then a
theory which abstracts from this variable is not likely to be highly predic-
tive— or, in any event, at least not for very long.33
Somewhat paradoxically, the “reductionist”34 approach to the law and
legal institutions embedded within neo-classical economics is also
reflected in conventional law and finance scholarship.  This scholarship
traces its origins to a pair of influential articles by economists Rafael La
Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny
(LLSV) that examined the legal protections afforded to shareholders and
creditors in different countries, the legal traditions from which these pro-
tections emerged, and their impact on stock market development.35  LLSV
started by constructing a series of formal indices designed to represent the
quality of investor protection laws and their enforcement.36  Using regres-
sion analysis, they then examined the relationship between these indices
and both their sample countries’ legal tradition (e.g. English common law,
French civil law, etc.) and various measures of domestic stock market
development (e.g. aggregate market capitalization and the number of listed
firms).37
On the basis of this analysis, LLSV arrived at two striking conclusions.
First, common law countries afforded investors higher levels of legal pro-
tection than civil law countries.38  Second, higher levels of legal protection
32. FRIEDMAN, supra note 31, at 25.
33. Implicit within this idea is the possibility that a variable that was previously
unimportant can, owing to a change of circumstances, subsequently become very impor-
tant indeed.
34. See, e.g., John Armour et al., Regulatory Sanctions and Reputational Damage in
Financial Markets 5, Ctr. for Economic Policy Research Discussion Paper No. DP8058
(2011).
35. Rafael La Porta et al., Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113 (1998); Rafael La
Porta et al., Legal Determinants of External Finance, 52 J. FIN. 1131 (1997). Ultimately, of
course, it is difficult to completely ring fence what qualifies as “conventional” law and
finance scholarship.  For the purposes of this Article, however, this term refers to schol-
arship that shares both LLSV’s reductionist approach toward the law and legal institu-
tions and its strict adherence to the assumption that the law is fundamentally exogenous
to finance.
36. To measure the quality of legal protections available to shareholders, for exam-
ple, LLSV focused on voting powers, the ease with which shareholders could participate
in the voting process, and the existence of legal protections against expropriation by
management.  To measure the quality of legal protections available to creditors, mean-
while, LLSV focused on, inter alia, the ability to take security and seize assets upon
default.  For further details, see La Porta et al., Legal Determinants of External Finance,
supra note 35, at 1134– 35.
37. See La Porta et al., Law and Finance, supra note 35, at 1122– 1125; see also La
Porta et al., Legal Determinants of External Finance, supra note 35, at 1137– 1139.
38. See La Porta et al., Law and Finance, supra note 35.
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were associated with more developed stock markets.39  Using similar meth-
odologies, subsequent empirical research also found a strong relationship
between stock market development and private— but not public— enforce-
ment of these protections.40  LLSV and their progeny have thus become
widely associated with the view that the law should be understood as play-
ing only a supporting role in finance and financial development, princi-
pally through the provision of clearly defined property rights and the
efficient contract enforcement necessary for private market participants to
make credible commitments to one another.41
LLSV’s research provided the theoretical and empirical foundations
for what has become an important body of scholarship examining how the
quality of private contractual mechanisms, public legal frameworks, and
background enforcement institutions influence investor behavior and, ulti-
mately, the patterns of ownership and financial development.42  At the
same time, however, this scholarship has attracted considerable method-
ological and other criticisms.  As a preliminary matter, LLSV’s reductionist
approach— as embodied in its famous indices for measuring the quality of
investor protection laws— often failed to fully or accurately account for the
legal substance, practical impact, or functional equivalence of these laws in
different countries.43  Along the same vein, LLSV’s proxies for the quality
of enforcement –  e.g. the governance and formal legal authority of public
39. La Porta et al., Legal Determinants of External Finance, supra note 35, at
1137– 1139.
40. See Simeon Djankov et al., The Law and Economics of Self-Dealing, 88 J. FIN. ECON.
430, 449 (2008); see also Rafael La Porta et al., What Works in Securities Laws?, 61 J. FIN.
1, 22 (2006).
41. In this respect, LLSV and their progeny can be viewed as consistent with
Douglass North’s conception of legal and other institutions as establishing the “rules of
the game.” See DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE 3 (1990).  This view is also reflected in a common, yet seemingly untena-
ble, interpretation of the Coase theorem as standing for the proposition that the null
hypothesis should be that the optimal government policy is to leave markets unregu-
lated. See La Porta et al., What Works in Securities Laws?, supra note 40, at 1.  Ultimately,
however, this view is dependent on a number of assumptions— e.g., perfect information,
clearly defined property rights, and costless enforcement— which, as Coase himself
acknowledged, are extremely unlikely to hold in the real world. See Djankov et al., The
Law and Economics of Self-Dealing, supra note 40, at 463.
42. See Thorsten Beck et al., Law and Finance: Why Does Legal Origin Matter? 31 J.
COMP. ECON. 653 (2003); Bernard S. Black, The Legal and Institutional Preconditions of
Strong Securities Markets, 48 UCLA L. REV. 781 (2001); Brian R. Cheffins, Does Law
Matter?  The Separation of Ownership and Control in the United Kingdom, 30 J. LEGAL
STUD. 459 (2001); John C. Coffee, The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: The Roles of the Law
and the State in the Separation of Ownership and Control, 111 YALE L. J. 1 (2001); Luzi
Hail & Christian Leuz, International Differences in the Cost of Equity Capital: Do Legal
Institutions and Securities Regulation Matter?, 44 J. ACCOUNTING RESEARCH 485 (2006);
Rafael La Porta et al., Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation, 57 J. FIN. 1147 (2002).
For a wide ranging survey of this literature, see Rafael La Porta et al., The Economic
Consequences of Legal Origins, 46 J. ECON. LIT. 285 (2008).
43. See Holger Spamann, The ‘Anti-Directors Rights Index’ Revisited , 23 REV. FIN.
STUD. 467, 469 (2010).  After correcting for these inaccuracies, Spamann re-ran LLSV’s
regressions and found significantly lower correlations between legal tradition and the
quality of investor protection laws, and between the quality of investor protection laws
and LLSV’s measures of stock market development.
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agencies responsible for enforcing investor protection laws –  failed to cap-
ture other potentially important determinants of the intensity of enforce-
ment.44  Together, these criticisms reflect the fact that conventional law
and finance scholarship has often confined its analysis to the ‘law on the
books’, thereby implicitly discounting the importance of the ‘law in
action’.45
Upon closer scrutiny, however, there exists an even more fundamental
lacuna at the heart of conventional law and finance scholarship.  Consis-
tent with its origins and grounding in the theory and methodologies of neo-
classical economics, LLSV and their progeny focus on developing predic-
tions about the impact of the law on patterns of ownership and financial
development.  This scholarship does not, however, attempt to explore the
myriad ways in which law and finance may be structurally interdepen-
dent.46Indeed, LLSV viewed the law as fundamentally exogenous to
finance.47  On one level, this view was likely driven by methodological
pragmatism; treating a country’s legal tradition as independent of the
structure of its financial system enabled LLSV and other scholars to side-
step potential endogeneity issues in connection with their regression analy-
ses.  On another level, however, this view arguably reflects the implicit
assumption that the law ultimately stands outside the structure of the finan-
cial system.  As explained by Katharina Pistor:
[This scholarship] treat[s] law and finance as separate spheres that are
related in a causal, unidirectional fashion, not as structurally intertwined.
Law determines the degree of investor protection and thereby establishes the
rules of the game for a financial marketplace in which actors respond to the
incentives [that] law creates . . . It follows that within this theoretical frame-
work law plays a critical role in the making of liquid markets . . .  [b]ut this is
where the story ends.48
Viewed from this perspective, the most fundamental criticism of conven-
tional law and finance scholarship arguably stems from its failure to
engage in a more systematic and rigorous examination of the many differ-
ent ways in which the law and finance interact with one another in the real
world.
44. See John C. Coffee, Law and the Market: The Impact of Enforcement, 156 U. PA. L.
REV. 229, 277 (2007); Howell Jackson & Mark Roe, Public and Private Enforcement of
Securities Laws: Resource-Based Evidence, 93 J. FIN. ECON. 207, 210 (2009); John Armour,
Enforcement Strategies in U.K. Corporate Governance: A Roadmap and Empirical Assess-
ment 34– 36 (European Corporate Governance Institute Working Paper Series in Law,
No. 106, 2008). As Jackson and Roe observe, these other determinants might include,
for example, financial, human, and other resources possessed by these agencies.  As
Coffee observes, different countries might also have different ‘styles’ of enforcement not
captured by more formal measures.  Coffee, supra note 44, at 277.
45. The phrase is borrowed from Roscoe Pound.  Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and
Law in Action, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 12, 14 (1910).
46. Katharina Pistor, Towards a Legal Theory of Finance, 35– 36 (Columbia Law Sch.
Pub. Law and Legal Theory Working Paper Grp., Paper No. 13-348, 2013).
47. See La Porta et al., Law and Finance, supra note 35, at 1126. See also La Porta et
al., The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins, supra note 42, at 286, 298.
48. Pistor, supra note 46,  at 35– 36.
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The theoretical limits of conventional law and finance scholarship can
be observed across at least three dimensions.  First, this scholarship dis-
counts the role of politics as an intervening variable in shaping both law
and financial development.  This is most clearly reflected in La Porta,
Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer’s 2008 article “The Economic Consequences
of Legal Origins,” in which the authors challenge the claim that a country’s
legal tradition is little more than a thinly veiled proxy for domestic polit-
ics.49  Predictably, the authors attempt to refute this claim by abstracting
away from the ‘messy’ dynamics of real world politics and instead con-
structing a set of formal proxies designed to measure variables such as a
country’s level of ‘social democracy,’ ‘leftist’ politics, and voting system.50
While this once again enables La Porta et al. to subject their data to quanti-
tative analysis, it also forces them to disregard a wealth of potentially useful
information about how law, finance, and politics interact in different coun-
tries.  As research by John Armour and Pirya Lele51, Curtis Milhaupt and
Katharina Pistor,52 Mark Roe,53 and others54 has demonstrated, this three-
way interaction can play an important role in determining the quality of
investor protection laws and their enforcement.
Second, conventional law and finance scholarship exhibits a pro-
nounced bias towards examining the role of the law in relation to a very
small subset of financial markets and instruments.  More specifically, this
scholarship has gravitated toward the markets for equity and debt, while
largely neglecting the derivatives, structured finance, and wholesale fund-
ing markets at the heart of the financial systems of most developed coun-
tries.55  Along the same vein, conventional law and finance scholarship has
tended to focus on a relatively narrow subset of the legal rules— e.g. com-
pany, securities, and bankruptcy law— which we might expect to influence
the behavior of financial market participants.  As described above, this
scholarship views these laws through the lens of their domestic legal tradi-
tion, predicting that common law countries are more likely to rely on pri-
vate ordering and ‘market-supporting’ laws while civil law countries are
more likely to rely on direct public regulatory intervention.56  Intuitively,
49. La Porta et al., The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins, supra note 42, at
311– 15.
50. Id.
51. John Armour & Priya Lele, Law, Finance, and Politics: The Case of India , 43 L. &
SOC. REV. 491 (2009).
52. CURTIS J. MILHAUPT & KATHARINA PISTOR, LAW AND CAPITALISM: WHAT CORPORATE
CRISES REVEAL ABOUT LEGAL SYSTEMS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AROUND THE WORLD
28– 31 (2008).
53. MARK ROE, POLITICAL DETERMINANTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 61 (2003).
54. See PETER GOUREVITCH & JAMES SHINN, POLITICAL POWER AND CORPORATE CON-
TROL: THE NEW GLOBAL POLITICS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 2– 3 (2005); Raguram Rajan
& Luigi Zingales, The Great Reversals: The Politics of Financial Development in the 20th
Century, 69 J. FIN. ECON. 5, 6 (2003).
55. This same bias can be observed in pre-crisis corporate finance scholarship. See
Perry Mehrling, Minsky and Modern Finance: The Case of Long-Term Capital Management,
46 J. PORTFOLIO MGMT. 81 (2000).
56. See generally La Porta et al., The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins, supra
note 42.
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however, these predictions are likely to have limited traction in many areas
of financial regulation.57  Perhaps most starkly, the fact that the U.S. and
U.K.— both common law jurisdictions— resorted to massive public bailouts
to support failing financial institutions during the recent crisis would
appear to contradict this scholarship’s central prediction.  This scholarship
is also unable to account for the ongoing harmonization of financial regula-
tion in many areas— e.g. capital, liquidity, and resolution requirements—
under the auspices of organizations such as the Financial Stability Board
and Basel Committee on Banking Supervision.58  Nor, similarly, can it
account for the emergence or increasing institutionalization of the regula-
tory regimes governing the single market for financial services within the
E.U.59
Third, and most importantly, conventional law and finance scholar-
ship has largely overlooked the relationship between law, financial instabil-
ity, and financial crises.  At first glance, this might seem like a somewhat
curious oversight.  Upon closer inspection, however, it is an almost inevita-
ble byproduct of this scholarship’s narrow substantive focus and theoreti-
cal underpinnings.  As described above, the primary thrust of this
scholarship has been to examine how the law influences the incentives of
investors.  This scholarship then makes the— often implicit— leap to say
that what is good for investors is also good for the broader financial sys-
tem.  As Katharina Pistor and others have observed, however, this leap rests
on neo-classical assumptions about the absence of information costs,
Knightian uncertainty,60 and, perhaps most importantly, liquidity con-
straints.61  It also ignores the potentially destabilizing effects of both wide-
spread regulatory arbitrage and the negative externalities associated with
socially excessive risk-taking.  As we shall see, however, once we reintro-
duce these variables into the equation, legal rules that may have been desir-
able from the perspective of investors may be undesirable from the
perspective of broader social welfare.62  Accordingly, as Pistor explains,
conventional law and finance scholarship can essentially be understood as
57. This is something which La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer rightly
acknowledge. Id. at 327.
58. See JOHN ARMOUR ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF FINANCIAL REGULATION (forthcoming
2015).
59. For a description of this evolving institutionalization, see Eilis Ferran, BUILDING
AN E.U. SECURITIES MARKET 58– 69 (2004); Eilis Ferran, Understanding the New Institu-
tional Architecture of E.U. Financial Market Supervision, in FINANCIAL REGULATION AND
SUPERVISION 111, 130– 44 (Eddy Wymeersch et al., 2012).
60. ‘Knightian,’ or ‘fundamental,’ uncertainty refers to future contingencies that are
not susceptible to probabilistic— i.e. statistical— measurement. See FRANK KNIGHT, RISK,
UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT 19– 20 (1921).  Unless otherwise indicated, references to
‘uncertainty’ in this Article should be construed as referring to Knightian uncertainty.
Ultimately, the distinction between high information costs and uncertainty is often diffi-
cult to make out in practice.  Accordingly, while this Article acknowledges that these two
concepts are conceptually distinct, it treats them as functionally equivalent insofar as
they both serve to undermine the ability of market participants to identify, estimate the
probability, or evaluate the likely impact of potential future states of the world.
61. Pistor, supra note 46, at 36– 37.
62. Id. at 22– 23.
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offering a theory for the good times in finance— not the bad.63
In the wake of the global financial crisis, it seems remarkable that a
theory of law and finance would not seek to incorporate these important
dimensions.  Yet this is precisely where conventional law and finance
scholarship— rooted in neo-classical assumptions, a reductionist view of
the law and legal institutions, and the belief that the law is fundamentally
exogenous to finance— ceases to provide us with meaningful insights.
What we need, therefore, is a complementary set of theoretical tools to help
us better understand the complex, dynamic, and interdependent relation-
ship between law and finance.
II. Law in Finance: The Legal Theory of Finance
The view that conventional law and finance scholarship is hamstrung
by significant theoretical and methodological blind spots is hardly new.64
Nor would many deny that the law plays an important role in the structure
of the financial system.  It is only recently, however, that scholars have
begun to more systematically examine the role of the law within different
market and institutional structures with the objective, ultimately, of devel-
oping more robust explanatory theories of the relationship between law
and finance.  Perhaps the most ambitious of these examinations has given
birth to what Katharina Pistor and others have labeled the ‘Legal Theory of
Finance’ (LTF).65
In sharp contrast with the prevailing neo-classical paradigm, LTF pro-
ceeds from the observation that high information costs, uncertainty, and
liquidity constraints are fundamental features of modern financial mar-
kets.66  Indeed, LTF views these market frictions as fundamentally inter-
twined.67  In the absence of information costs and uncertainty, market
participants would be able to write complete state contingent contracts
which that allocated risk in every potential future state of the world—
thereby ex ante addressing any potential future liquidity problems.  In the
absence of liquidity constraints, meanwhile, market participants could rest
easy in the knowledge that, whatever unforeseen contingencies might arise
ex post, it would be possible for them to obtain refinancing.
Where high information costs, uncertainty, and liquidity constraints
converge, however, the inevitably incomplete contracts written by market
participants can become potentially significant triggers for market volatil-
63. Id. at 36.
64. See Spamann, supra note 43; Jackson and Roe, supra note 44; Coffee, supra note
44.
65. LTF was the product of an interdisciplinary research project examining the role
of the law in the structure of consumer credit, foreign exchange, sovereign debt, and
derivatives markets.  The results of this research were published in a special issue of the
Journal of Comparative Economics. See generally Katharina Pistor, Law in Finance, 41 J.
COMP. ECON. 311 (2013).
66. Pistor, supra note 46, at 3– 6. See also Dan Awrey, Complexity, Innovation and the
Regulation of Modern Financial Markets, 2 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 235.
67. Pistor, supra note 46, at 27.
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ity and, in extremis, financial instability.68  At the root of this potential
instability is the relationship between funding and market liquidity.  Intui-
tively, we would expect the ability of market participants to pay their liabil-
ities (i.e. funding liquidity) to be a function of their ability to transform
non-cash assets into cash on a timely basis and with minimal price impact
(i.e. market liquidity).69  We would expect this market liquidity, in turn, to
be a function of, inter alia, the information costs market participants must
incur in order to value these assets, along with these market participants’
perceptions of any fundamental uncertainty associated with their value.
Ceteris paribus, we would expect higher information costs and uncertainty
to be reflected in lower levels of market liquidity, higher market volatility
and, ultimately, lower asset prices.
Where market participants are driven by liquidity constraints to sell
assets into markets characterized by high information costs and uncer-
tainty, therefore, the resulting realizations may be insufficient to cover their
liabilities.  As Hyman Minsky observed, this convergence of uncertainty
and liquidity constraints is likely to be especially problematic for market
participants that engage in maturity transformation and, therefore, rely on
the continued availability of short-term funding in order to finance the
acquisition and holding of long-term assets.70  Viewed from this perspec-
tive, the potential for broader financial instability is then a function of how
many market participants are driven to seek refinancing— i.e. funding
liquidity— at the same time.71  Importantly, as described in greater detail
below, the law often plays a central role in terms of both triggering these
liquidity demands and determining their degree of correlation.
It is against this backdrop of high information costs, fundamental
uncertainty, liquidity constraints, and potential instability that LTF offers
us valuable insights into the relationship between law and finance.  At the
heart of LTF are four interwoven propositions.72  First, financial markets
do not exist independently of the contracts, private rules, and public laws
that create and support them.  Put differently, contrary to the assumptions
embedded within conventional law and finance scholarship, the law is
endogenous to finance.  Second, these legal constructions invariably ema-
nate from both public and private sources, making financial markets
hybrid systems.  Third, the extent to which market participants will be
required to strictly adhere to these legal constructions is a function of their
position relative to the apex of the system.  The financial system is thus
inherently hierarchical.  Forth, while these rules are necessary to support
68. Id.
69. For a more fulsome examination of the relationship between market and funding
liquidity and its implications in terms of the stability of financial markets, see Markus K.
Brunnermeier & Lasse Heje Pedersen, Market Liquidity and Funding Liquidity, 22 REV.
OF FIN. STUD. 2201, 2201– 02 (2009).
70. Hyman Minsky, The Financial Instability Hypothesis: An Interpretation of Keynes
and an Alternative to ‘Standard Theory,’ in CAN “IT” HAPPEN AGAIN?: ESSAYS ON INSTABILITY
AND FINANCE 65 (M.E. Sharpe, Armonk, eds., 1982).
71. Pistor, supra note 46, at 6– 7.
72. For a detailed discussion of each of these propositions, see id. at 21– 33.
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the development of financial markets, they are also a potentially significant
source of financial instability.  The remainder of this section briefly exam-
ines each of these four propositions.
A. The Legal Construction of Financial Markets
Financial markets are not naturally occurring phenomena.  Financial
markets are made.  They are made of private contracts which create the
financial claims we often refer to as ‘equity,’ ‘debt,’ or ‘derivatives.’  They
are made of the private rules created by market participants in order to
foster deep, liquid markets for these contracts.  And, importantly, they are
made of the public laws and legal institutions which support these con-
tracts and ensure their effective enforcement.73  The global markets for
interest rate, currency, credit, equity, and other swaps offer an illustrative
example.  The emergence, growth, and proliferation of these markets in
recent decades owes much to the development of standardized contracts by
market participants working under the auspices of the International Swaps
and Derivatives Association (ISDA).74  ISDA has also played an important
role in developing private rules— e.g., auction settlement and determination
committees for credit default swaps (CDS)— that ensure the smooth and
orderly functioning of these markets.75  Finally, and once again owing to
ISDA’s intervention, swaps typically enjoy explicit carve-outs from the
automatic stay and fraudulent preference provisions under public bank-
ruptcy laws, thereby enabling market participants to enforce close-out net-
ting and related financial collateral arrangements upon a termination event
or event of default under these contracts.76  In the absence of any one of
these legal constructions, it seems highly unlikely that the structure of
these markets would look anything like it does today.
73. As Pistor observes, we would expect this reliance on public laws and legal insti-
tutions to become more pronounced as societies move toward more ‘market-based’ sys-
tems of finance.  The reason for this is that the fungibility and liquidity of contracts
within such systems depends on credible contractual commitments that are enforceable
in a court irrespective of the identity or idiosyncratic characteristics (e.g. creditworthi-
ness) of the relevant counterparties. Pistor, supra note 46, at 1– 2.  One potential excep-
tion is sovereign debt issued under domestic law, where the ability of the state to
opportunistically amend the law ex post makes it difficult for the law or legal institutions
to generate credible commitments. See Anna Gelpern & Brad Setser, Domestic and Exter-
nal Debt: The Doomed Quest for Equal Treatment, 35 GEO. J. INT’L L. 795 (2004).
74. See Dan Awrey, The Dynamics of OTC Derivatives Regulation: Bridging the Public-
Private Divide, 11 EUR. BUS. ORG. LAW REV. 155, 163 (2010); Dan Awrey, Toward a Sup-
ply-Side Theory of Financial Innovation, 41 J. COMP. ECON. 401, 402 (2013); Glenn Mor-
gan, Market Formation and Governance in International Financial Markets: The Case of
OTC Derivatives, 61 HUM. REL. 637, 644– 645 (2008).
75. See Dan Awrey, The Limits of Private Ordering Within Modern Financial Markets,
34 REV. BANKING AND FIN. L. (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 24– 25), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2262712.
76. See Mark Roe, The Derivatives Players’ Payment Priorities as Financial Crisis Accel-
erator, 63 STAN. L. REV. 539, 565 (2011).  Until recently, they have also been effectively
exempt from public securities laws in a number of core jurisdictions. See Awrey, supra
note 66, at 164. .
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These contracts, private rules, and public laws create a complex web of
rights and obligations between market participants, between market par-
ticipants and the state, and between states.77  Indeed, in a very real way,
these rights and obligations are the financial system.  Moreover, as the
swaps example clearly illustrates, these rights and obligations are often
structurally interdependent.  As a result, we would expect changes in one
part of the system to precipitate changes elsewhere.  Perhaps most impor-
tantly, changes in public law can spur private contractual innovation.
Thus, for example, the introduction of Regulation Q in the U.S., which
imposed a hard ceiling on the interest rates that banks were permitted to
pay depositors, set the stage for the emergence of money market funds.78
The core contractual features of modern structured finance markets were
similarly motived by the desire to minimize the impact of the regulatory
capital requirements introduced under Basel II.79  The introduction of
Basel III has also predictably spurred a new round of contractual innova-
tions, such as collateral swaps and synthetic exchange-traded funds.80  At
the same time, these private contractual innovations can also be seen as
driving changes in public law, whether it be to ensure their enforceability
or ameliorate their harmful effects.  As Pistor observes, law and finance are
thus engaged in a dynamic process where private contracts and rules
emerge and evolve in response to changes in public laws, and where public
laws respond to the problems generated by these contractual innova-
tions.81  Viewed from this perspective, the law becomes of first order
importance in terms of explaining the behavior and interactions of market
participants and, ultimately, the structure of the financial system.82
B. The Essential Hybridity of Finance
Once we acknowledge the legal construction of financial markets, the
essential hybridity of finance comes squarely into view.  This hybridity can
be observed in a variety of different contexts.  Perhaps most obviously, fiat
money issued by central banks is used as a medium of exchange in what
77. Pistor, supra note 46, at 8.
78. See Timothy Cook & Jeremy Duffield, Money Market Mutual Funds: A Reaction to
Government Regulation or a Lasting Innovation?, 65 FED. RES. BANK OF RICHMOND ECON.
REV. 15 (1979); R. Alton Gilbert, Requiem for Regulation Q: What It Did and Why It
Passed Away, FED. RES. BANK OF ST. LOUIS REV. 22, 22 (1986), available at https://
www.richmondfed.org/publications/research/economic_review/1979/pdf/er650402.
pdf. .  Indeed, as described in greater detail in Sections IV and V, the development of
money market funds shares a number of important parallels with the development of
WMPs.
79. See David Jones, Emerging Problems with the Basel Capital Accord: Regulatory Cap-
ital Arbitrage, 24 J. MONEY, BANKING & FIN. 35 (2000).  As described by Jones, these
features include: (1) the concentration of credit risk through structural subordination
(i.e. tranching), (2) the remote origination of loans through special purpose vehicles,
and (3) indirect credit enhancement in the form of, inter alia, the provision of back-up
liquidity facilities by sponsoring financial institutions. Id. at 41– 42.
80. See Awrey, Toward a Supply Side Theory of Financial Innovation, supra note 74, at
274– 75.
81. Id. See also Pistor, supra note 46, at 2.
82. Pistor, supra note 46, at 3.
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many might characterize as purely ‘private’ transactions.  Ultimately, the
fact that you bought your morning coffee with cash and not, say, a pineap-
ple is a direct product of state intervention.  This same observation applies
equally to far more complex financial transactions where fiat money is
used either as a medium of exchange or as financial collateral.  This
hybridity is also reflected in the structure of foreign exchange and sover-
eign debt markets; both are private markets for financial claims that are
underwritten by states.83  More fundamentally, as we have already seen,
contracting parties often rely on the state to provide background enforce-
ment institutions and other laws necessary to support the development of
ostensibly private markets.  Finally, and perhaps most importantly, it is
the state— in its capacity as lender of last resort— which stands as the ulti-
mate guarantor of the contractual rights and obligations which collectively
make up the financial system.84  Indeed, it is at precisely this point that the
essential hybridity of finance intersects with yet another fundamental fea-
ture of the financial system: its inherent hierarchy.
C. The Hierarchy of Finance and the Elasticity of Law
In a world of relative certainty and ample liquidity, one could be for-
given for thinking that the financial system was essentially flat.  Flat in the
sense that we would observe relatively tight credit spreads between finan-
cial claims issued by public and private borrowers of varying degrees of
creditworthiness.  And flat in the sense that many privately issued finan-
cial claims would be viewed as effective substitutes for both fiat money and
sovereign debt and, thus, widely used as collateral within, for example,
derivatives and wholesale funding markets.  Indeed, as Gary Gorton,
Andrew Metrick and others have noted, this is precisely what we observed
in the heady days leading up to the global financial crisis.85
In times of uncertainty and illiquidity, however, the financial system
reveals its inherent hierarchy.86  During such periods of market turmoil,
private market participants may of course intervene to provide liquidity.87
It was private market participants, for example, that intervened to rescue
the hedge fund Long-Term Capital Management in 1998.88  Market partici-
83. See Rachel Harvey, The Legal Construction of Global Foreign Exchange Markets,
41 J. COMP. ECON. 343 (2013); Perry Mehrling, Essential Hybridity: A Money View of Law
and Finance for Foreign Exchange, 41 J. COMP. ECON. 355 (2013); Pistor, supra note 46, at
25.
84. Pistor, supra note 46, at 26.
85. See Gary Gorton & Guillermo Ordonez, Collateral Crises, 104 AM. ECON. REV.
343 (2014); Gary Gorton & Andrew Metrick, Securitized Banking and the Run on Repo,
104 J. FIN. ECON. 425 (2012); Gary Gorton, Information, Liquidity, and the (Ongoing)
Panic of 2007, 99 AM. ECON. REV. 567 (2009).
86. Pistor, supra note 46, at 15.
87. See generally Walter Engert, Jack Selody & Carolyn Wilkins, Financial Market
Turmoil and Central Bank Intervention, BANK OF CAN. FIN. SYS. REV. 71 (2008), http://
.www.bankofcanada.ca/2008/?profile_post=walter-engert&post_type%5B0%5D=post
&post_type%5B1%5D=page.
88. Although, even here, the Federal Reserve played an important role in coordinat-
ing the private bailout. See ROGER LOWENSTEIN, WHEN GENIUS FAILED: THE RISE AND FALL
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pants will only intervene, however, where they perceive it to be in their best
interests to do so, and only up to the point where their own survival is at
stake.89  As Perry Mehrling has observed, this suggests that the only true
lender of last resort is a market participant with no survival constraint and
a theoretically unlimited supply of liquidity in the form of high powered
money.90  Ultimately, there are very few market participants— namely, sov-
ereign states that both control their own currency and are able to issue
debt in that currency— that can perform this function.91
The inherent hierarchy of finance can be observed at both the domes-
tic and international level.  At the international level, the importance of the
U.S. dollar within global financial markets and its de facto status as the
world’s reserve currency put the U.S. and its central bank, the Federal
Reserve, at the apex of the hierarchy.92  Immediately beneath the U.S. are a
select group of jurisdictions, including the Eurozone, U.K., Japan, Brazil,
Canada, and Switzerland, whose central banks have established swap lines
with the Federal Reserve designed to ensure sufficient U.S. dollar liquidity
during periods of market turmoil.93  At the domestic level, meanwhile, it is
clear from the recent crisis that central banks do not stand prepared to
provide liquidity support to all market participants on the same terms.
The Federal Reserve’s initial response to the crisis, for example, was to pro-
vide support for the primary dealers responsible for making markets in
U.S. sovereign debt.94  Only later did the Fed extend support to other mar-
ket participants.95  This decision reflected the harsh reality that, in the
event of a crisis, the probability that a market participant will receive
liquidity or other support from the lender of last resort would be a function
of its position relative to the apex of the financial system.96
This hierarchy has important implications in terms of the elasticity of
the contracts, private rules, and public laws to which these market partici-
pants are subject.  As Pistor explains, elasticity in this context can be
understood as a measure of the probability that the rights and obligations
arising under these legal constructions will be strictly enforced in the con-
OF LONG-TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT 161 (2000); Franklin Edwards, Hedge Funds and the
Collapse of Long-Term Capital Management, 13 J. ECON. PERSP. 189 (1999); Myron
Scholes, Crisis and Risk Management, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 17 (2000).
89. Id.
90. PERRY MEHRLING, THE NEW LOMBARD STREET: HOW THE FED BECAME THE DEALER OF
LAST RESORT (2011).  High powered money includes bank reserves and fiat money held
by the public, the terms and issuance of which are directly controlled by central banks.
91. Pistor, supra note 46, at 15.
92. MEHRLING, supra note 90.
93. For further information about these swap lines, see Central Bank Liquidity Swap
Lines, BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, available at
www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/reform_swaplines.htm.  In effect, these swap lines
enable the central banks in these jurisdictions to provide U.S. dollars to domestic banks
so that they could, in turn, fund their U.S. dollar liabilities.
94. Pistor, supra note 46, at 16.
95. Even then, the Federal Reserve still prioritized those market participants active
in U.S. sovereign debt markets. Id. at 16– 17.
96. Id.
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text of an unfolding crisis.97  The lower the probability, the more elastic the
law.98  At the apex of the system, the law is often relatively elastic.  Indeed,
this is frequently by design; statutory incompleteness is often used as a
‘safety valve’ to ensure that public authorities have the legal flexibility
needed to respond to unforeseen circumstances.  The absence of detailed
legislative frameworks governing the activities of central banks in many
jurisdictions, for example, enables them to pursue a policy of ‘constructive
ambiguity’ with regard to the provision of lender of last resort facilities.99
Simultaneously, these frameworks typically also confer upon central banks
considerable discretion to undertake extraordinary measures in the inter-
est of maintaining financial stability.100
In many other cases, however, this elasticity is an ex post— essentially
improvised— response to the threat of financial instability.  The decision of
the Federal Reserve and U.S. Treasury Department to rescue AIG, for exam-
ple, was motivated in large part by the systemic importance of AIG’s
counterparties, including Goldman Sachs, Deutsche Bank, and Socie´te´
General.101  Crucially, the rescue thus included measures that had the eco-
nomic effect of releasing these counterparties from their outstanding obli-
gations arising from billions of dollars of CDS contracts— obligations that
they had freely contracted to assume.102  Juxtaposed against the fate of
tens of thousands of U.S. homeowners in the wake of the crisis, this out-
come brings the inherent hierarchy of finance into sharp relief.  It also
raises important issues surrounding the potential tradeoffs between the
maintenance of financial stability and the rule of law.
D. Law as a Source of Financial Instability
As described above, the most important contributions of conventional
law and finance scholarship flow from its insights into how the law and
legal institutions can help generate credible commitments and thereby sup-
port financial development.  Far less appreciated, however, is the fact that
the law can also be an important source of financial instability.103  First, in
a world of incomplete contracting, contractual rights and obligations can
be a source of structural rigidity.104  It is the contractual rights of deposi-
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. See Xavier Freixas, Optimal Bailout Policy, Conditionality and Constructive Ambi-
guity, (Ctr. for Econ. Pol’y Research, Working Paper No. 400, 1999).  This constructive
ambiguity theoretically enables central banks to ameliorate the moral hazard problems
generated by the (implicit) promise of state support.
100. See, e.g., Federal Reserve Act, 12 U.S.C. § 226 (2014).
101. See CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT PANEL, June Oversight Report: The AIG Rescue, Its
Impact on Markets, and the Government Exit Strategy (2010) [hereinafter CONGRESSIONAL
OVERSIGHT PANEL].
102. This included purchasing collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) from AIG’s
counterparties at face value in exchange for the termination of the CDS contracts which
AIG had written on these CDOs. Id. at 102.
103. See Pistor, supra note 46, at 12.
104. See Kathryn Judge, Fragmentation Nodes: A Study in Financial Innovation, Com-
plexity and Systemic Risk, 64 STAN. L. REV. 657 (2012); Gorton & Metrick, supra note 85.
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tors to withdraw their money on demand, for example, which generates the
risk of destabilizing bank runs.105  Similarly, it was the contractual rights
of AIG’s CDS counterparties to demand that the insurer post collateral
upon the occurrence of certain specified triggering events— e.g., a credit
rating downgrade of the relevant reference obligations or of AIG itself—
which, together with a corresponding run by its securities lending
counterparties, put such severe pressure on AIG’s liquidity.106  Notably,
the quality of the law in this context is positively correlated with instabil-
ity; the easier it is for a market participant to enforce their contractual
rights, the less likely they will be willing to renegotiate them in light of
changing circumstances, and the more likely instability will occur as a
result.  Accordingly, while it may be in the rational self-interest of individ-
ual market participants to exercise these rights, this decision— especially
when replicated across a large number of market participants— can have
broader destabilizing effects.107
Second, as described above, changes in public law and regulation can
spur private contractual innovation.  This innovation— often referred to as
regulatory arbitrage— is a product of the competitive forces which drive a
modern market economy.108  These forces compel market participants to
identify and pursue arbitrage strategies designed to mitigate the private
costs of public regulatory intervention.  Perhaps most importantly, they
compel market participants to contract around regulation that is designed
to ensure that these market participants internalize any negative externali-
ties generated by their activities.  Broadly speaking, these strategies involve
either: (1) developing new contractual structures which reduce the impact
of this regulation or (2) shifting activities to financial markets or institu-
tions subject to less burdensome regulatory regimes.  In effect, these strate-
gies seek to exploit inconsistencies between the economic substance of a
contractual structure and its legal or regulatory treatment.109
Crucially, where these strategies prove successful, the same competi-
tive forces that provided the impetus for this regulatory arbitrage also
incentivize other market participants to imitate it.  Market participants may
thus pursue highly correlated arbitrage strategies, thereby driving capital
and risk into potentially less developed, poorly regulated segments of the
financial system. Where the markets and institutions into which this capi-
tal and risk are channeled are also vulnerable to uncertainty and liquidity
shocks, the law can thus be understood as an endogenous source of poten-
tial instability.
105. Itay Goldstein & Ady Pauzner, Demand-Deposit Contracts and the Probability of
Bank Runs, 60 J. FIN. 1293, 1293– 94 (2005).
106. CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT PANEL, supra note 101, at 62– 63.
107. Pistor, supra note 46, at 11– 13.
108. Pistor, supra note 30, at 7, citing HYMAN MINSKY, STABILIZING AN UNSTABLE ECON-
OMY 234 (1986).  These same competitive forces, however, can also be influential in
shaping the structure of the hybrid financial systems that exist in countries such as
China.
109. See Victor Fleischer, Regulatory Arbitrage, 89 TEX. L. REV. 227, 229 (2011).
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Figure 1: Comparing LTF with the Neo-classical “Reductionist” View
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Together with more conventional accounts, LTF’s four core proposi-
tions provide us with a potentially useful theoretical framework for explor-
ing the complex, dynamic, and interdependent relationship between law
and finance.  Ultimately, however, the only real acid test for LTF is whether
these propositions can help us better understand the interactions between
law and finance in the real world.  Perhaps most importantly, what can LTF
tell us about the behavior of market participants?  What can it tell us about
the determinants of the constantly evolving structure of the financial sys-
tem, or about the sources of potential instability?  This Article explores
these important questions through the lens of a single case study: the emer-
gence, meteoric rise, and potential risks of WMPs.
III. WMPs: A Case Study in Financial Innovation and Instability
Any attempt to understand the emergence of China’s shadow banking
system must necessarily begin with an examination of its formal –  i.e.
licensed –  banking system.  Indeed, as we shall see, it is the structure and
regulation of this formal banking system that has been the principal cata-
lyst behind the emergence and growth of the market for WMPs.
A. The Chinese Banking System: A Brief Overview
Since 1978, the Chinese banking system has evolved from a wholly
state-owned system to one in which various categories of state-owned and
private sector banks coexist and, increasingly, compete with one another
for business (see Figure 2).  The first category consists of three wholly
stated-owned banks: Agricultural Development Bank of China, China
Development Bank, and China Exim Bank.  These so-called ‘policy’ banks
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operate under explicit mandates from the Chinese government.  The man-
date of the Agricultural Development Bank of China, for example, is to
support the development of agriculture in rural areas.110  In furtherance of
these mandates, policy banks are typically called upon to provide medium
to long-term financing for large public infrastructure projects such as the
Three Gorges Dam.111  These policy banks report directly to China’s State
Council, which, in turn, appoints each bank’s officers and directors and
plays an influential role in setting operational priorities.112  These policy
banks also rely on the Chinese government for funding in the form of both
direct borrowing from the central bank— the People’s Bank of China
(PBOC)— and the provision of implicit and explicit government guarantees
on their publicly issued debt.113
The second category of banks is comprised of five partially state-
owned ‘commercial’ banks (SOCBs): Agricultural Bank of China, Bank of
China, Bank of Communications, China Construction Bank, and Industrial
and Commercial Bank of China.114  The Chinese government holds a
majority equity stake in four of these five SOCBs.115  Simultaneously, how-
ever, these institutions have also issued a fraction of their outstanding
equity to the public.116  The shares representing this equity are typically
listed and traded on both mainland exchanges in Shanghai or Shenzhen
(which list ‘A’ Class shares) and the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (which
lists ‘H’ Class shares).117  As of October 2014, these five SOCBs had an
aggregate market capitalization of approximately RMB4.3 trillion
($USD700 billion).118
Ownership structure aside, the governance structure of SOCBs is in
many respects functionally similar to that of the policy banks.  The activi-
ties of each SOCB are overseen by a board of directors, the members of
110. See Mission and Purpose, AGRICULTURAL DEV. BANK OF CHINA (Sept. 16, 2005),
http://www.adbc.corn.cn/templates/T_secondEN/index.aspx?nodeid=87&page=Con
tentPage&contentid=5941.
111. Fredrik Andersson et al., Lending for Growth? An Analysis of State-Owned Banks
in China 6 (Lund U. Dep’t of Econ., Working Paper 2013); The Three Gorges Dam, CHINA
DEVELOPMENT BANK, available at http://www.cdb.com.cn/english/NewsInfo.asp?NewsId
=280. .
112. MARTIN, supra note 4, at 2.
113. For example, for the fiscal year 2012, Agricultural Development Bank of China
funded 13% of its liabilities– or RMB272 billion ($USD44.6 billion)— through borrow-
ings from the PBOC. Annual Report, PEOPLE’S BANK OF CHINA (2012) [hereinafter PBOC
Annual Report].
114. MARTIN, supra note 4, at 3.
115. As of May 2009, the Chinese state owned 70.7% of the shares of Industrial &
Commercial Bank of China, 57.13% of the shares of China Construction Bank, 83.13%
of the shares of Agricultural Bank of China, 67.53% of the shares of the Bank of China,
and 26.52% of the shares of Bank of Communications. Id.
116. This process, known in China as ‘equitization’, began in 2005 and was designed
to promote a more ‘profit-oriented’ focus amongst the management of SOCBs. Id. at 3– 4.
117. The difference between ‘A’ and ‘H’ Class shares is effectively twofold.  ‘A’ Class
shares are denominated in renminbi and can only be sold to Chinese investors and
qualified foreign institutional investors.  ‘H’ Class shares, in contrast, are denominated
in Hong Kong dollars and can be sold to overseas investors.
118. Financial Times Markets Data (accessed October 10, 2014).
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which include both representatives appointed by major shareholders—
including, importantly, the Chinese government— and senior officers.119
The board of directors and senior officers are then monitored by a board of
supervisors, which is made up of representatives appointed by the Central
Organization Department of the Chinese Communist Party, labor unions,
and major shareholders.120  The Chinese Communist Party and govern-
ment thus exercise considerable influence over the appointment and career
paths of senior officers, directors, and supervisory board members.121
This influence raises important questions about whether SOCBs are
run on a commercial basis or as instruments of government policy.  A
number of observers have argued that these quasi-public institutions are
vulnerable to political interference.122  These observers point to the fact
that commercial banks are explicitly required to conduct their business “in
accordance with the needs of the national economic and social develop-
ment and under the guidance of the industrial policies of the State.”123  As
described in greater detail below, they are also subject to PBOC-issued
‘window guidance.’124  Other observers, in contrast, argue that SOCBs are
fully autonomous commercial enterprises.125  PBOC Governor Zhou
Xiaochuan, for example, stated in 2010 that “all financial institutions [with
the exception of policy banks] operate on a fully commercial basis, and an
important sign of their autonomy is [their ability] to independently price
their products and services.”126  Whatever one makes of these arguments,
it seems reasonable to suggest that SOCBs at the very least blur the line
between the state and private enterprise.
119. MARTIN, supra note 4, at 26– 27.
120. See Katharina Pistor, The Governance of China’s Finance, in CAPITALIZING CHINA
35, 44– 45 (Joseph P.H. Fan and Randall Morck ed., 2012).
121. Id. at 44– 45; see also MARTIN, supra note 4, at 26– 27.
122. See Robert Cull & Lixin Colin Xu, Who Gets Credit? The Behavior of Bureaucrats
and State Banks in Allocating Credit to Chinese State-Owned Enterprises, 71 J. DEV. ECON.
533, 535– 540 (2003).
123. National People’s Congress, Database of Laws and Regulations, Law of the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China on Commercial Banks, Art. 39 (1995), http://www.npc.gov.cn/
englishnpc/Law/2007-12/12/content_1383716.htm.
124. See infra Section IV.
125. See, e.g., Memorandum from Christian Marsh to Paul Piquado, Dep’t of Com-
merce, Issues and Decision Memorandum for Final Results of Countervailing Duty
Administrative Review: Certain Oil Country Tubular Goods from the People’s Republic
of China (Aug. 7, 2013), available at http://enforcement.trade.gov/frn/summary/prc/
2013-19733-1.pdf.
126. Zhou Xiaochuan, A Few Thoughts on Mark-based Interest Rate Reform, THE PEO-
PLE’S BANK OF CHINA (Jan. 4, 2011), http://www.pbc.gov.cn/publish/english/955/2011/
20110130101631093294254/20110130101631093294254_.html.
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Figure 2: Assets and Market Share of Chinese Banks by Category
(as at the end of 2011)
Category 
Asset Value 
(100m RMB)
Market 
Share (%) 
Policy banks    93,133 8.22 
SOCBs 536,336 47.35 
City commercial banks 99,845 8.81 
Rural commercial banks, rural cooperative 
banks and rural credit cooperatives 
128,599 11.34 
Joint-stock commercial banks 183,794 16.22 
Foreign banking subsidiaries 21,535 1.90 
Other banking institutions 69,603 6.14 
Source: CBRC Annual Report (2011) at 119.127
The five SOCBs dominate lending within China’s formal banking sys-
tem; together, they represent approximately 47.3% of total banking assets
as of 2011.128  This system is, however, also home to a diverse range of
other banking institutions.  These institutions include a small number of
fully private banks, including twelve joint-stock commercial banks and
forty locally incorporated subsidiaries of foreign banking institutions.129
They also include so-called ‘city commercial’ banks— banks that are typi-
cally created by provincial or municipal authorities to finance local projects
or programs— along with village and township banks, rural commercial
banks, rural cooperative associations, and rural credit cooperatives.  As of
2011, the China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) reported that
there were 144 city commercial banks, 349 village and township banks,
212 rural commercial banks, 190 rural cooperative banks, and 2,265 rural
credit cooperatives operating in China.130  Over time, many of these
smaller, local banks have made the transition from wholly state-owned
institutions to joint-stock companies with varying degrees of private sector
ownership.131
Operating in parallel with China’s formal banking system is a large
and vibrant shadow banking system.  The term ‘shadow banking’ is often
used to describe financial markets and institutions that perform credit,
maturity, or liquidity transformation outside the formal banking sys-
tem.132  Under this definition, the Chinese shadow banking system can be
thought to include a diverse range of ‘non-bank’ markets and market par-
ticipants, from trust companies, brokerage firms, and LGFVs, to informal
127. Regrettably, both the PBOC and CBRC only make these figures available on a
sporadic basis.
128. CBRC Annual Report, supra note 8, at 24.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. MARTIN, supra note 4, at 4.
132. See Pozsar et al., supra note 10, at 4– 5.
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lenders, loan sharks, and even pawn shops.133  The breadth of this defini-
tion, however, undermines its utility as the basis for examining the eco-
nomic function, structure, and regulation of specific markets and
institutions.  It also implicitly assumes, often incorrectly, that the formal
and shadow banking systems are not highly interconnected.
Perry Mehrling and others have advanced a somewhat narrower— if in
many respects complementary— definition of shadow banking as money
market funding of capital market lending.134  Amongst other benefits, this
definition makes room for the possibility that the ownership structures,
operations, and funding models of formal and shadow banking systems
may be intricately intertwined.  By explicitly linking funding with lending,
this definition also highlights the important relationship between funding
and market liquidity examined in Section II.  Except as otherwise indi-
cated, our examination of the functions, structure, and potential risks of
WMPs will therefore proceed on the basis of this narrower definition.
Estimates of the size of the Chinese shadow banking system, broadly
defined, vary significantly, with recent figures ranging from $USD2.2 tril-
lion to $USD4.8 trillion.135  This variance is attributable, at least in part, to
the relative opacity of many of the markets and institutions that make up
this system.136  Indeed, perhaps the only thing that we know with any cer-
tainty is that this system has experienced rapid growth in the wake of the
global financial crisis.  Standard & Poor’s, for example, recently estimated
that non-bank credit intermediation in China has grown at an annualized
rate of 34% since 2010.137  The salient question is thus: what is driving
this dramatic growth?  This question takes us to the very heart of our
inquiry.
B. Bank Regulation in China
At first glance, the regulatory framework governing China’s formal
banking system resembles those commonly found in more advanced econo-
mies.  The CBRC is responsible for the prudential regulation and supervi-
sion of Chinese banks.  Its responsibilities include: authorizing and
licensing the establishment of banks; supervising their compliance with
capital, liquidity, and other regulatory requirements; ensuring that they
have put in place and maintain adequate internal systems, processes, and
133. See Li, supra note 11, at 4.
134. See Perry Mehrling et al., Bagehot was a Shadow Banker: Shadow Banking, Central
Banking, and the Future of Global Finance, 2, (Dec. 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2232016.
135. Li, supra note 11, at 1 (reporting estimates of various financial institutions
between June 2012 and January 2013).  At the top end of these estimates, this would put
the shadow banking system at roughly one third the size of the formal banking system.
136. Different surveys also employ different definitions of what constitutes the
shadow banking system. See id.
137. Standard & Poor’s, Will Shadow Banking Destabilise China’s Financial System?,
FINANCEASIA, April 10, 2013, http://www.financeasia.com/News/339168,will-shadow-
banking-destabilise-china8217s-financial-system.aspx.
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controls; and conducting periodic asset quality reviews and stress tests.138
One of the centerpieces of the CBRC’s prudential regime is a relatively con-
servative maximum loan-to-deposit ratio of 75%.139  Notably, however,
unlike in many other countries, deposits are not currently covered by an
explicit deposit insurance scheme.140  At the same time, though, the Chi-
nese government has historically stepped up to provide full compensation
to depositors of failed banks.141
As in many other countries, China’s central bank— the PBOC— also
plays an important role in the regulation of the formal banking system.  As
a preliminary matter, the PBOC is responsible for setting reserve require-
ments for regulated banks.  Reserve requirements prescribe a minimum
fraction of deposits that banks must hold in the form of cash, as opposed
to loans, marketable securities, or other financial assets.  These require-
ments can thus be understood as a tool of both monetary policy (enabling
the central bank to adjust the supply of money in circulation) and pruden-
tial policy (enabling them to ensure that banks maintain sufficient cash on
hand to satisfy their short-term liabilities to depositors and other credi-
tors).  Unlike most of its counterparts, the PBOC has adopted a dynamic,
differentiated system of reserve requirements, with different banks subject
to different ratios on the basis of their size, systemic importance, loan
growth, capital adequacy, and other prudential measures.142  These
requirements are then adjusted on a quarterly, and in some cases monthly,
basis in response to changes in these measures.143  The PBOC is also
138. See About the CBRC, CBRC, www.cbrc.gov.cn (last visited February 21, 2015).  In
October 2013, for example, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS)
deemed the CBRC’s capital rules were deemed compliant with Basel III. China’s Basel III
Graded ‘Compliant’, CBRC, October 10, 2013, http://www.cbrc.gov.cn/chinese/home/
docView/187603855FBA4860BE9DB191EA44B433.html.  Simultaneously, of course, as
is the case in many other jurisdictions, it is difficult to measure the quality or intensity
of the CBRC’s supervision.
139. National People’s Congress, Database of Laws and Regulations, Law of the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China on Commercial Banks, Art. 39(2) (1995), http://
www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/12/content_1383716.htm. The CBRC has
recently announced its intention to relax this ratio for banks operating within the Shang-
hai Free-Trade Zone. See Richard Silk, Shanghai ‘Free-Trade Zone’ Opens, WALL ST. JOUR-
NAL, September 29, 2013, http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142405270230391880
4579104970567894460.
140. The PBOC has, however, stated for some time that the establishment of an
explicit deposit insurance scheme is a top priority. Financial Stability Analysis Group of
the People’s Bank of China, China: Financial Stability Report 2013, PEOPLE’S BANK OF
CHINA 217 (2013), http://www.pbc.gov.cn/publish/english/959/2013/201308131514
34349656712/20130813151434349656712_.html; Li, supra note 11, at 5. See William
Kazer, China Signals Move on Deposit Insurance, WALL ST. JOURNAL, June 7, 2013, http://
www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324069104578531100407148648.
141. See Michael Faure & Jiye Hu, Towards a Deposit Guarantee Insurance in China?  A
Law and Economics Perspective, 1 CHINESE J. COMP. L. 256, 263– 65 (2013).
142. For further information regarding the PBOC’s relatively complex reserve require-
ment regime, see Guonan Ma et al., China’s Evolving Reserve Requirements 3 (Bank for
International Settlements, Working Paper No. 360, 2011), available at http://
www.bis.org/publ/work360.htm.
143. Id. at 4.  The PBOC thus adjusts reserve requirements far more frequently than
its counterparts in other jurisdictions.  This is tied to the fact that, unlike many other
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responsible for setting and adjusting the so-called ‘discount’ (or ‘bank’)
rate.  The discount rate represents the rate of interest at which banks may
borrow cash from the central bank— typically on a secured basis— in order
to meet their short-term liquidity needs.  Finally, the PBOC is also respon-
sible for providing liquidity and other support to distressed banks in its
capacity as lender of last resort.
In addition to these conventional tools of monetary and micro-pruden-
tial policy, the PBOC has historically utilized two decidedly more uncon-
ventional mechanisms.  The first mechanism revolves around a series of
benchmark interest rates, established by the PBOC, to which the deposit
and lending rates of banks have historically been tethered.  Figure 3 sets
out the benchmark rates for loans and time deposits as of December 31,
2012.144
Figure 3: PBOC Benchmark Loan and Deposit Rates
(as of December 31, 2012)
 3 Mo. 6 Mo. 1 year 2 years 3 years 5 years 
Loans 5.60 6.00 6.15 6.15 6.15 6.40 
Deposits 2.60 2.80 3.00 3.75 4.25 4.75 
Sources: PBOC Annual Report (2012) at 171.
Until recently, Chinese banks were required to offer savings and credit
products within relatively tight bands around these benchmarks.145  Thus,
for example, as of December 31, 2012, banks were not permitted to under-
write loans for less than 70% of the applicable benchmark rate.146  Interest
on deposits, meanwhile, was capped at 110%.147  These benchmarks thus
served to lock in a minimum spread— typically in the neighborhood of 3%
on one year funds148— between deposit and lending rates, thereby effec-
tively guaranteeing banks a profit on their carry trade.149  Over time, how-
ever, this system of floors and ceilings has been gradually relaxed as part of
jurisdictions, the PBOC uses adjustments to these requirements explicitly for the pur-
poses of influencing credit growth. See id.
144. The PBOC also sets rates for short-term loans to financial institutions, demand
deposits, and small USD deposits. See PBOC Annual Report, supra note 114, at 171.
145. Id. at 27– 28
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. This 3% figure does not incorporate the discretion of individual banks to
charge/pay rates within the permitted bands.  In general, the ceiling on deposit rates is
considered binding as actual rates tend to cluster around the benchmark. See Dong He
& Honglin Wang, Dual-Track Interest Rates and the Conduct of Monetary Policy in China,
23 CHINA ECON. REV. 928, 943 (2012).  It is considerably more difficult to determine
whether the floor on lending rates is equally binding.
149. Guonan Ma, Who Pays China’s Bank Restructuring Bill?, 6 ASIAN ECON. PAPERS 46,
50– 52 (2007).  In a nutshell, the carry trade refers to the strategy of borrowing at a
given rate of interest for the purpose of investing in higher yielding assets of a similar
duration.
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China’s ongoing transition to a market-based interest rate regime.150  This
culminated with the July 2013 announcement that the PBOC would remove
the floor on lending rates— thus leaving in place only a ceiling on the inter-
est rates banks are permitted to pay depositors.151
The second unconventional policy mechanism utilized by the PBOC is
so-called ‘window guidance.’  Issued as part of the PBOC Quarterly Mone-
tary Policy Report, this ‘guidance’ is in effect a system of informal quotas
that prescribe both the desired level of credit growth and the sectors of the
real economy to which this credit should (and should not) be channeled.
Historically, these quotas have often been allocated to individual banks.152
In 2013, for example, it was reported that the four largest SOCBs were
collectively allocated over RMB2.9 trillion ($USD473 billion) in new
credit.153  While the means by which the PBOC enforces compliance with
these quotas is not entirely clear, the influence of the Chinese Communist
Party over the career paths of senior bankers can be seen as a potentially
potent sanctioning mechanism.  Simultaneously, however, at least at the
aggregate level, the PBOC has not always been particularly successful in
enforcing compliance.  In 2009, for example, the PBOC’s aggregate quota
of RMB4.6 trillion was exceeded by RMB5 trillion— more than double its
original target.154  As with PBOC’s system of benchmark deposit and lend-
ing rates, Chinese officials have also taken great pains in recent years to
signal a more relaxed stance towards the enforcement of these quotas, as
part of China’s transition to a more market-based interest rate regime.155
C. The Origins, Basic Mechanics, and Legal Structure of WMPs
The growth of the Chinese shadow banking system, and of WMPs in
particular, in the wake of the global financial crisis is a direct consequence
of the structure and regulation of the formal banking system.  The catalyst
for this growth can be traced back to November 2008— specifically, the Chi-
nese government’s announcement of a RMB4 trillion ($USD586 billion)
stimulus package designed to insulate China’s economy from the effects of
150. ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OP AND DEVELOPMENT, OECD ECONOMIC
SURVEYS: CHINA 12 (2010), available at http://browse.oecdbookshop.org/oecd/pdfs/
product/1010061e.pdf.
151. See David Barboza, China Eases Bank Loan Rules, in a Step Toward Market Driven
Economy, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/20/business/
global/china-liberalizes-lending-rates.html?_r=0.  Additionally, the PBOC previously
removed the floor on deposit rates and ceiling on lending rates.
152. Although, unlike the aggregate quotas, the allocations to individual banks are
typically shrouded in secrecy.
153. See China PBOC Sets 2013 Credit Quota for Big 4 Banks at Nearly CNY3 Trillion –
Report, EUROINVESTOR, Jan. 18, 2013. http://www.euroinvestor.com/news/2013/01/18/
china-pboc-sets-2013-credit-quota-for-big-4-banks-at-nearly-cny3-trillion-report/121798
21.
154. See China Monetary Policy Report Quarter 4, PEOPLE’S BANK OF CHINA (2009)
[hereinafter PBOC Policy Report]. This divergence between targeted and actual credit
growth was attributable, at least in part, to the RMB4 trillion stimulus package intro-
duced in November 2008. See infra Section IV.
155. See MARTIN, supra note 4, at 10; Zhou, supra note 126.
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the global slowdown brought on by the financial crisis.156  This stimulus
had the desired effect, with the amount of new credit increasing by 92%
over just one year from approximately RMB5 trillion in 2008 to approxi-
mately RMB9.6 trillion in 2009.157  Simultaneously, however, this rapid
credit growth placed enormous strain on Chinese banks, raising concerns
about the quality of the loans they had underwritten and, ultimately, the
stability of the banks themselves.158  In response to these concerns, the
PBOC raised reserve requirements twelve times over a period of eighteen
months, eventually reaching a high of 21.5% for the largest banks in June
2011.159  The PBOC also reportedly used window guidance and other
mechanisms to channel capital away from the sectors of the economy—
including commercial real estate development— that it perceived to be at a
risk of overheating.160
By increasing the fraction of deposits that banks were required to hold
in cash, the PBOC’s changes to its reserve requirements constrained the
ability of banks to use their balance sheets as a source of credit growth.161
The PBOC’s window guidance, meanwhile, deterred banks from lending to
sectors of the economy experiencing high levels of growth and returns.162
And as we have already seen, the PBOC’s ceiling on deposit rates prevented
banks from offering market-based returns on time deposits and other sav-
ings products.  Indeed, as the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco has
observed, deposit accounts at Chinese banks yielded negative real returns
for most of the period between 2008 and 2012.163  This, in turn, provided
would-be depositors with powerful incentives to seek out higher yielding
investment products.  Taken together, the constraints on the supply of
156. See David Barboza, China Unveils $586 billion Stimulus Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10,
2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/10/world/asia/10iht-10china.176732
70.html.
157. PBOC Policy Report, supra note 154.
158. See, e.g., Reuters, Moody’s Sees Much Bigger Local Debt in China, N.Y. TIMES, July
5, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/06/business/global/06iht-yuan06.html.
159. Li, supra note 11, at 1; Ma et al., supra note 142, at 3.  By way of comparison, the
current reserve ratio prescribed by the U.S. Federal Reserve is 10% for net transaction
accounts of more than $USD89 million.
160. See China Banks Halt New Credit to Developers This Year, REUTERS, Nov. 14, 2010,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/11/14/china-property-loans-idUSTOE6AD00N
20101114. See also China’s Shadow Banks: The Credit Kulaks, THE ECONOMIST, June 1,
2013, http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21578668-growth-
wealth-management-products-reflects-deeper-financial-distortions; Chen Long, Why Did
Chinese Shadow Banking Surge After 2009?, INSTITUTE FOR NEW ECONOMIC THINKING (May
28, 2013), http://ineteconomics.org/%5Btermalias-raw%5D/why-did-chinese-shadow-
banking-surge-after-2009.
161. Jamil Anderlini & Josh Noble, China Cuts Reserve Ratio for Small Banks, FIN.
TIMES, June 9, 2014, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/25592974-efd2-11e3-bee7-00144
feabdc0.html?siteedition=intl#axzz3Ibby5XRx.
162. For a discussion of these trends in a broader macroeconomic context, see INT’L
MONETARY FUND COUNTRY REPORT NO. 12/195, PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (2012), avail-
able at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2012/cr12195.pdf.
163. See Li, supra note 11, at 1.  Again, this divergence between nominal
(benchmarked) and real interest rates was attributable, at least in part, to the inflation-
ary impact of the 2008 stimulus package.
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credit within the formal banking system, the pent-up demand for credit in
the real economy, and the thirst for yield amongst investors— each the prod-
uct of regulatory intervention— set the stage for the growth of China’s
shadow banking system and, ultimately, the rise of WMPs.
WMPs are a form of collective investment vehicle that raises large
pools of capital from multiple investors in exchange for the issuance of
financial claims.164  These claims come in two basic varieties.  The first
variety creates a contractual obligation on the part of WMPs— or third
party guarantors— to return investors’ principal upon the expiry of a speci-
fied term.165  The second variety, in contrast, contemplates no such obliga-
tion, thus leaving investors theoretically exposed to the loss of their entire
investment.166  The Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco has estimated
that approximately 37% of bank-issued WMPs are effectively principal
guaranteed.167  If these estimates are accurate, then roughly 63% of WMPs
do not contractually guarantee the return of investors’ principal.
All WMPs are marketed to investors on the basis of a specified— typi-
cally floating— rate of return on their investment.  The average annualized
rate of return is reportedly in the range of 5%.168  However, there are
numerous reports of products offering returns in excess of 7– 8%.169  Nota-
bly, these returns are not necessarily linked to the cash flows generated by
the assets in which the capital accumulated by WMPs is invested.  Nor, in
164. The minimum threshold for investment is typically in the neighborhood of
RMB50,000– 100,000 ($USD8,000– 16,000).  At the same time, new entrants such as
online retailer Alibaba have begun offering products with effectively no minimum
thresholds. See Simon Rabinovitch, Treasure Piles Up for Alibaba as Depositors Desert
China’s Banks, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2013, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/58dfd7ce-
63d8-11e3-98e2-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3Hfr8Msfl.
165. See Li, supra note 11, at 3.
166. See id. Simultaneously, of course, even investors in principal-guaranteed WMPs
are still exposed to the credit risk of the guarantor.  Indeed, it is not entirely clear
whether or to what extent principal guarantees— which are themselves often provided by
small, private firms— effectively reduce risks for investors. Rabinovitch, supra note 164.
167. This includes products that offer either fixed or minimum guaranteed returns.
See Li, supra note 11, at 3.
168. See Fitch: WMP Issuance by Chinese Banks Stabilising, REUTERS, June 10, 2013,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/06/10/fitch-wmp-issuance-by-chinese-banks-
stab-idUSFit66030020130610; Qizheng Mao, Measuring Off-Balance-Sheet Wealth Man-
agement Business of Commercial Banks: The Case in China, IFC Bulletin No. 36 (Feb.
2013), available at http://www.bis.org/ifc/publ/ifcb36d.pdf; DONG TAO & WEISHIN
DENG, CREDIT SUISSE, ECONOMIC RESEARCH REPORT: CHINA: SHADOW BANKING –  ROAD TO
HEIGHTENED RISKS (2013), available at https://doc.research-and-analytics.csfb.com/doc
View?language=ENG&format=PDF&document_id=1010517251&source_id=emcmt&
serialid=VLRQ4TgNxWzk%2fTvHinuua2HrCBNc0syIwcysInvEMe0%3d.
169. See Simon Rabinovitch, Uncertain Foundations, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2012. http://
www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/7070ccdc-3ade-11e2-bb32-00144feabdc0.htm; Henry Sender,
Finance: Money for Nothing, FIN. TIMES, July 11, 2013, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/
40ca3e9e-e40e-11e2-b35b-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3JH9k2qvH; Kelvon Soh & Michael
Flaherty, Special Report –  China’s Answer to Subprime Bets: The ‘Golden Elephant’,
REUTERS, Aug. 5, 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/08/06/us-china-banks-
idUSBRE87501T20120806.
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the vast majority of cases, are these returns contractually guaranteed.170
The term structure of WMPs varies from as short as a matter of days to
as long as five years.  The majority of products, however, are issued for
terms of between one and three months.171  The assets in which WMPs
invest, meanwhile, are often of a much longer duration.  These assets can
include relatively liquid investments such as equities, corporate bonds, or
money market funds.  Crucially, however, they can also include highly
illiquid investments such as loans to SMEs and LGFVs, along with invest-
ments in private equity, trust companies, and commercial real estate.172
There have also been reports of WMPs raising capital to invest in more
‘exotic’ assets such as car dealerships, pop concerts, and even ham
sales.173  Ultimately, however, it has historically been extremely difficult
for investors to determine the precise nature of the assets in which WMPs
invest.174  An informal survey of over 50 WMPs conducted by The Finan-
cial Times, for example, found that only one of the surveyed products dis-
closed its target investments.175  To make matters worse, the capital raised
by WMPs is often pooled with capital from other products, thus rendering
the underlying investments even more opaque.176  This opacity has led to
concerns that investors do not understand the risks associated with invest-
ments in these products.177  Figure 4 depicts the stylized anatomy of a
WMP.
170. The Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, for example, has estimated that only
about 4% of bank-issued WMPs contractually guarantee a minimum rate of return. Li,
supra note 11, at 3.
171. Id. at 3; TAO & DENG, supra note 168, at 5; Value of Wealth Management Products
Issued by Banks in 13Q3 Tops CNY 15 Tn, CHINASCOPE FINANCIAL, Oct. 22, 2013.
172. Li, supra note 11, at 2.
173. See Kelvin Soh & Michael Flaherty, Analysis: Too Big To Fail?  China’s Wealth
Management Products Stir Debate, REUTERS, Dec. 19, 2012, http://www.reuters.com/arti
cle/2012/12/19/us-china-investment-wealth-idUSBRE8BI1GV20121219.
174. As described below, the CBRC has recently taken steps to enhance the trans-
parency of WMPs.
175. Rabinovitch, supra note 169.
176. See TAO & DENG, supra note 168, at 17.
177. See, e.g., Simon Rabinovitch, China Investment Products Draw Complaints, FIN.
TIMES, Dec. 27, 2012, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/53c75f8e-5004-11e2-a231-00
144feab49a.html?siteedition=intl#axzz3SQqjHo6P. See also Li, supra note 11; TAO &
DENG, supra note 168.
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Figure 4: Anatomy of a WMP
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WMPs are structured and marketed by trust companies, insurance
companies, brokerage firms, and, most importantly, banks.178  Indeed,
banks frequently partner with trust companies or brokerage firms to struc-
ture and market these products to investors.  These partnerships enable
trust companies and brokerage firms to utilize banks’ often vast branch
networks as a distribution channel for their products.179  They also enable
banks to utilize trust or broker-structured products as a means of repack-
aging and removing assets from their balance sheets.180
The first WMP was offered by China Everbright Bank in 2004.181  It
was not until 2008– 2009, however, that WMPs emerged as an important
source of financing and investment.  According to the Fitch Ratings, the
total outstanding volume of bank-issued WMPs grew from just over RMB2
trillion ($USD328 billion) in 2009 to approximately RMB13 trillion
178. The discussion which follows focuses largely on WMPs structured and/or mar-
keted by banks.  For a discussion of the structure of non-bank WMPs, see TAO & DENG,
supra note 168, at 16– 18.
179. See TAO & DENG, supra note 168, at 13.
180. TAO & DENG, supra note 168, at 16; China’s Shadow Banks: The Credit Kulaks,
supra note 160.
181. Mao, supra note 168, at 2.  The appearance of WMPs coincided with the CBRC’s
decision to permit banks to engage in renminbi-denominated wealth management
business.
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($USD2.12 trillion) as of May 2013.182  Of this total, Fitch estimates that
approximately 51% have been issued by SOCBs, 36% by joint-stock com-
mercial banks, and 13% by city commercial and rural banks.183  It esti-
mates the number of WMPs outstanding to be in the range of 13,500, with
gross issuance of new products approaching 115 per day.184
The dramatic growth of WMPs can be attributed to several factors.
First, WMPs are not legally characterized as deposits and are, accordingly,
exempt from the PBOC’s ceiling on deposit rates.185  This enables banks
and other intermediaries to market WMPs to investors as higher yielding
substitutes for conventional term deposits and other savings products.186
Second, WMPs give significant benefits to the banks that structure and
market them.  Perhaps most importantly, they provide a means of shifting
unwanted assets off bank balance sheets.187  Thus, for example, a bank can
use one or more WMPs to raise capital in a fund pool (see Figure 3) and
then use this capital to purchase its own unwanted loans or other assets.
Along a similar vein, by originating investments off-balance-sheet, WMPs
enable banks to circumvent the PBOC’s credit quotas, freeing them up to
extend more credit and to then direct this credit to high growth sectors of
the economy.
Simultaneously, the term structure of WMPs is often designed to
ensure ostensible compliance with both the CBRC’s maximum loan-to-
deposit ratio and the PBOC’s reserve requirements.188  Importantly, com-
pliance with these requirements is typically verified by regulators on a
monthly or quarterly basis.189  By ensuring that WMPs mature and that
the funds are automatically deposited in investors’ savings accounts just
prior to the relevant verification dates, banks can thus generate the appear-
ance of technical compliance while in reality evading the substantive spirit
of these requirements and obscuring their true liquidity position and levels
of maturity transformation.
The emergence and growth of the market for WMPs poses a number of
potentially significant risks.  As described above, the opacity of many of
these products, particularly their underlying investment portfolios, raises
182. FITCH RATINGS, supra note 17.
183. Id.
184. Id. Others, meanwhile, have estimated the total number of WMPs outstanding at
somewhere between 20,000– 30,000.
185. See generally Moran Zhang, China’s Wealth Management Products (WMPs) Lure
Investors with Higher Yields, INT’L BUS. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2014, http://www.ibtimes.com/
chinas-wealth-management-products-wmps-lure-investors-higher-yields-charts-1543709.
186. See TAO & DENG, supra note 168, at 9. It has been estimated that approximately
70% of WMPs are purchased by households. Mao, supra note 168, at 74.
187. FITCH RATINGS, supra note 17. See also TAO & DENG, supra note 168, at 5.  As of
January 1, 2013, an entity that controls one or more other entities is required to present
consolidated financial statements. See Consolidated Financial Statements No. 10, INTERNA-
TIONAL FINANCIAL REPORTING STANDARD (2011). As of writing, however, the convergence
of China’s Accounting Standards for Business Enterprises with IFRS No. 10 –  and thus
its potential impact on WMPs –  remains unclear.
188. See China’s Shadow Banks: The Credit Kulaks, supra note 160. See also Li, supra
note 11.
189. See Li, supra note 11.
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clear investor protection concerns.  Compounding matters, WMPs are
often marketed to retail investors as ‘low risk’ investments that are func-
tionally equivalent to deposit accounts.190  This perception is no doubt
bolstered by the central role of banks in the marketing of these products,
coupled with the widespread belief that— despite the absence of an explicit
deposit guarantee scheme— the Chinese government will stand behind
them.191  The opacity of WMPs, combined with their heterogeneity, also
undermines the ability of the CBRC and PBOC to identify and evaluate the
probability and likely impact of potential risks.192  Perhaps most impor-
tantly in this regard, the use of WMPs as off-balance-sheet financing vehi-
cles undercuts the reliability of financial reporting requirements as a
means of evaluating the financial health and stability of Chinese banks.
Arguably the most significant risk, however, stems from the potential
maturity and liquidity mismatches between WMPs’ assets and liabilities.
As described above, many of the assets in which WMPs invest are relatively
illiquid credit instruments such as loans to SMEs, local governments, trust
companies, and commercial real estate developers.193  Moreover, these
assets may not generate sufficient cash flows in the short-term to be able to
repay WMPs’ liabilities to investors upon maturity.194  To refinance these
assets, therefore, WMPs typically rely on funds available in the broader
fund pool.  Crucially, these funds are themselves often raised from the issu-
ance of new WMPs.195  Banks also rely on wholesale funding— e.g., repo—
markets.  In this very important respect, the funding liquidity of WMPs
hinges on the continued availability of short-term refinancing in the form
of either subsequent WMPs or interbank borrowing.196  In the event that
such refinancing became materially more expensive— or even altogether
unavailable— WMPs would thus potentially be forced to dispose of illiquid
assets to fund their obligations to investors.  This, in turn, can be seen as
generating a direct link between the funding liquidity of WMPs and the
190. TAO & DENG, supra note 168, at 3.
191. See Li, supra note 11, at 3; China’s Shadow Banks: The Credit Kulaks, supra note
160.  This perception and its implications are discussed in greater detail in Section V(b).
192. See Mao, supra note 168.
193. Fitch estimates that as of early 2013, WMP fund pools held approximately
RMB3.5 trillion ($USD579 billion) in trust companies.  It also estimated that, while only
16% of WMPs explicitly contained loans and/or discounted bills, many WMPs invested
in a wide variety of credit assets “disguised” as other assets. See FITCH RATINGS, supra
note 17.  Ultimately, of course, given the opacity of many WMPs, it is difficult to deter-
mine precisely what proportion of overall assets are invested in these illiquid claims.
194. See Li, supra note 11, at 2.
195. This includes funds that are effectively “rolled over” by investors from one WMP
to another.
196. Indeed, this characteristic has prompted several observers to compare WMPs
with so-called ‘Ponzi’ schemes. See Xiao Gang, Regulating Shadow Banking, CHINA DAILY,
Oct. 12, 2012, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2012-10/12/con-
tent_15812305.htm; Kate Mackenzie, Chinese Banks Weapons of Mass Ponzi,
FTALPHAVILLE BLOG, Aug. 8, 2012, http://ftalphaville.ft.com/2012/08/08/1111011/chi-
nese-banks-weapons-of-mass-ponzi/; George Magnus, Markets Insight: China’s Ponzi
Credit Boom Faces Crunch, FIN. TIMES, June 24, 2013, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/
db5c83dc-da67-11e2-8062-00144feab7de.html#axzz3JpNXsC5l.
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market liquidity of these underlying assets.  As examined in greater detail
in Section V, these maturity and liquidity mismatches thus leave WMPs
vulnerable to destabilizing runs triggered by the convergence of fundamen-
tal uncertainty and liquidity constraints.
Chinese regulators have recently taken a number of steps to address
the risks posed by WMPs.197  On March 25, 2013, the CBRC issued a
series of rules designed to ensure, inter alia, that bank-issued WMPs are
linked to specific underlying investments, that they disclose certain infor-
mation about these investments to investors, and that their investments in
certain prescribed classes of illiquid assets do not exceed 35% of total
assets under management.198  In October 2013, the CBRC launched a pilot
program designed to counteract the public perception that WMPs offer
guaranteed returns.199  It has also been reported that, beginning in 2014,
the CBRC will require banks to report detailed information about their
WMPs to regulators.200  The State Council, meanwhile, has also weighed in
on the matter, calling for an overarching regulatory framework governing
the shadowing banking system and for greater coordination between the
PBOC and CBRC.201  At present, however, it is still far from clear what this
new framework might look like, let alone what impact it is likely to have on
the market for WMPs.
If properly implemented, the CBRC’s initiatives should theoretically
enhance transparency for investors.202  They will also make it easier for
regulators to identify and evaluate potential risks.  Whether they will also
address the prudential risks generated by the fragile capital structure of
WMPs, however, remains to be seen.  Moreover, there is still a great deal
regulators simply do not know about this complex and evolving market.
Nor, importantly, are market participants likely to stand still as these regu-
latory changes are implemented.
197. See Sale of Wealth Management Products by Commercial Banks –  CBRC Tightens
Regulation, LINKLATERS, October 18, 2011, http://www.linklaters.com/Insights/Asia
News/LinkstoChina/Pages/Sale-Wealth-Management-Products-Commercial-Banks-
CBRC-Tightens-Regulation.aspx.
198. See CBRC Tightening up the Administration on Wealth Management Business by
Commercial Banks, LINKLATERS, May 3, 2013, http://www.linklaters.com/Insights/Asia
News/LinkstoChina/Pages/CBRC-Tightening-Administration-Wealth-Management-Busi
ness-Commercial-Banks.aspx.
199. See Wealth Management Products’ Yield ‘Not Guaranteed’, CHINA DAILY, Oct. 11,
2013, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2013-10/11/content_17023678.htm.
200. See Weihao Cao & Gabriel Wildau, China Regulator Orders More Disclosure on
Shadow Banking Products –  Report, REUTERS, Nov. 22, 2013, http://www.reuters.com/
article/2013/11/22/us-china-banks-regulations-idUSBRE9AL0BS20131122.
201. See Lingling Wei & Bob Davis, Regulators at Odds on Reining In China’s Shadow
Lending, WALL ST. JOURNAL, Jan. 14, 2014, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000
1424052702303819704579320054102965402?mod=_Newsreel_3. See also Simon
Rabinovitch, China Draws Up New Rules to Curb Shadow Banking, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 6,
2014, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/cbfc9e1a-76a0-11e3-a253-00144feabdc0.html.
202. Whether investors are likely to take advantage of this greater transparency is
another matter, examined in greater detail below.
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IV. Here Be Dragons: The Law and Finance of WMPs
LTF is an inductive theory.  It seeks to identify patterns from observa-
ble facts and then use these patterns as the basis for constructing theoreti-
cal frameworks.203  In contrast with the physical sciences, however, these
frameworks should not be viewed as principles of universal application.
Indeed, in the realm of social phenomena, ceteris are almost never paribus.
Rather, these frameworks should be viewed as maps, with their value ulti-
mately derived from their ability to help us make sense of the often interde-
pendent relationships within complex social systems.  With this objective
in mind, this section explores two important questions.  First, what can
LTF tell us about the emergence, growth, and potential risks of WMPs?
And second, what can WMPs tell us about the potential insights— and lim-
its— of LTF?
A. The Legal Construction of WMPs
China has always represented something of a puzzle from the perspec-
tive of conventional law and finance scholarship.  On the one hand, consis-
tent with this scholarship’s central prediction, the relatively poor quality of
China’s investor protection laws and background enforcement institutions
is reflected in its relatively underdeveloped public equity and debt mar-
kets.204  On the other hand, however, despite these apparent drawbacks,
the Chinese economy has enjoyed over three decades of almost unprece-
dented growth.205  Franklin Allen, Jun Qian, and Meijun Qian have sug-
gested that at least part of the answer to this puzzle resides in the role of
relationship and reputation-based enforcement mechanisms as effective
substitutes for strong laws and legal institutions.206  Ultimately, however,
while these mechanisms might play an important role within certain seg-
ments of the Chinese shadow banking system— e.g., local government
financing and informal lending— they fail to provide a comprehensive
explanation for the existence or widespread use of financial instruments
such as WMPs, which, ostensibly at least, rely on the formal legal system
for their validation and enforcement.
LTF, in contrast, views the emergence and growth of WMPs not as a
product of weak laws and legal institutions, but of strong ones.  In the Chi-
nese context, these institutions include both the PBOC and CBRC.207
These institutions write, monitor, and enforce market participants’ compli-
ance with formal regulatory mechanisms such as reserve requirements,
benchmark deposit rates, and loan-to-deposit ratios.  They also seek to reg-
ulate the behavior of market participants via less formal— but potentially
203. Pistor, supra note 46, at 7.
204. Allen et al., supra note 21.
205. The Chinese economy has enjoyed such growth even after adjusting for popula-
tion and purchasing power parity. See id. at 59.
206. Id. at 58– 61.
207. While not legally constituted in the same way, these institutions also include the
Communist Party machinery to which these public bodies are ultimately accountable.
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no less influential— policy mechanisms such as window guidance.208
Together, these mechanisms impose significant opportunity and other
costs on market participants, constraining their ability to offer market
rates of interest, the amount of leverage they can employ, and the asset
classes in which they can invest.  The stronger these laws and legal institu-
tions, therefore, the more powerful the incentives of market participants to
find innovative ways of contracting around them.
Viewed from this perspective, the emergence and growth of WMPs is
best understood as a private contractual response to changes in the con-
straints imposed by various forms of public regulatory intervention.  Put
differently, WMPs are designed to occupy the negative legal space created
by the existence of public regulatory intervention elsewhere within the
financial system.  Indeed, one would be hard pressed to make sense of the
legal structure of WMPs without referring to the regulatory regime gov-
erning Chinese banks.  The use of legally separate fund pools, for example,
appears principally motivated by the desire to ensure both that: (1) the
relevant liabilities are not characterized as deposits subject to the PBOC’s
ceiling on deposit rates, and (2) the assets in which WMPs invest are not
consolidated on bank balance sheets or subject to the PBOC’s credit quo-
tas.  As described above, these fund pools also enable banks to repay inves-
tors out of the proceeds obtained from the issuance of new WMPs.  The
term structure of these products, meanwhile, is often designed to game
both the PBOC’s reserve requirements and the CBRC’s minimum loan-to-
deposit ratio.  Where combined with a principal guarantee, the economic
substance of a WMP thus closely resembles that of a time deposit, without
being subject to the same restrictive regulatory treatment.  The emergence
of WMPs is thus a product of the dynamic, structurally interdependent
relationship between public law and regulation and private contractual
structures.  Thus, as Chinese regulators take action to close existing loop-
holes and address the risks posed by WMPs, we would expect to observe
further rounds of contractual innovation.
At this point, it is worth noting that there are a number of interesting
and important parallels between WMPs and another significant financial
innovation: U.S. money market funds (MMFs).  MMFs are open-ended col-
lective investment schemes that invest primarily in short-term money mar-
ket instruments.  MMFs trace their origin to amendments to the Federal
Reserve Act, which were introduced during the Great Depression.209
These amendments prohibited commercial banks from paying interest on
demand deposits and authorized the Federal Reserve to establish interest
rate ceilings on time and savings deposits of less than $USD10,000.210
These ceilings, introduced in 1934 in the form of Federal Reserve Regula-
208. As described above, the Communist Party and State Council also exercise con-
siderable influence over the appointment of senior officers, directors, and supervisory
board members of regulated banks. See infra Section IV(a).  This, in turn, represents
another informal mechanism for influencing the behavior of market participants.
209. See Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L. 73-66, § 11(b), 48 Stat. 162 (1933).
210. Gilbert, supra note 78, at 22.
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tion Q, were designed to incentivize smaller rural banks to extend credit
within their local communities, rather than to hold large balances with
larger money center banks.211
From their introduction until the mid-1960s, the ceilings imposed
under Regulation Q were generally above market rates of interest, and,
accordingly, had little practical impact from the perspective of deposi-
tors.212  During the high inflation of the mid-to-late 1970s, however, Regu-
lation Q became a binding constraint on the ability of commercial banks
and thrifts to offer depositors market rates of interest.213  MMFs emerged
to exploit the resulting gap in the marketplace.  Timothy Cook and Jeremy
Duffield estimate that there were no more than a small handful of MMFs in
the U.S. in 1974; by 1975, however, there were approximately 35 MMFs
with assets of approximately $USD4 billion, and by 1979, MMFs were
attracting inflows of over $2 billion per month.214  The U.S. Congress
responded by passing the Monetary Control Act of 1980,215 with the objec-
tive of gradually phasing out the interest rate ceilings imposed under Regu-
lation Q.216
The parallels between MMFs and WMPs are striking.  First, the initial
demand for MMFs, like WMPs, can be attributed to the imposition of regu-
latory ceilings on the rates of interest which banks were permitted to pay
depositors.217  Second, in both cases, these ceilings were imposed in an
attempt to influence the supply of credit to the real economy.  (As an aside,
these first two parallels highlight the fact that financial repression is not
just a developing world problem.)  Third, during periods of high inflation,
these ceilings spurred legal innovation designed to circumvent the regula-
tory regimes governing the formal banking system, thereby satisfying the
pent-up demand for higher yielding substitutes to conventional savings
products.
All this is not to suggest that understanding WMPs, MMFs, or any
other form of financial innovation as legal constructions fully explains the
complex dynamics of these markets.  Indeed, many important questions
remain unanswered.  Is it really the case, for example, that investors rely
exclusively on their contractual rights— enforced via the formal legal sys-
tem— to ensure that WMPs pay out as promised?  Moreover, if the relevant
laws and legal institutions are so strong, why do Chinese regulators con-
211. Id. at 22.  These ceilings were also designed to increase bank profits and thereby
disincentivize them from acquiring riskier assets that might undermine their financial
health. Id. at 23.
212. Indeed, when market rates briefly fell below the ceiling in 1957, and again in
1962, the Federal Reserve simply raised the ceiling. Id. at 26.
213. Id.  Regulation Q was expanded to include thrifts in 1966.
214. Cook & Duffield, supra note 78, at 15.
215. Monetary Control Act of 1980, Pub. L. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132 (1980).
216. For a more detailed timeline of the phase out of Regulation Q, see Gilbert, supra
note 78, at 31.
217. This is not to suggest that MMFs do not hold out other potential benefits (e.g.
diversification, economies of scale, or lower trading costs).  Ultimately, however, if diver-
sification was the primary driver of innovation in this context, it is difficult to explain
why these products did not appear far earlier.
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tinue to permit banks to use WMPs as a form of off-balance-sheet financ-
ing?  Both of these questions are examined in greater detail below.  For the
moment, however, it is important simply to understand the role that the
law played in both spurring the emergence of WMPs and dictating their
legal structure.  As we shall see, it is this structure that is vulnerable to the
convergence of fundamental uncertainty and liquidity constraints and thus
is a potential source of financial instability.
B. The Essential Hybridity of WMPs
To understand how WMPs might become a source of financial insta-
bility, we must first examine their deeply embedded hybridity.  At first
glance, utilizing a case study drawn from the Chinese financial system to
highlight the essential hybridity of finance might seem like a particularly
brazen attempt to pick some extremely low hanging fruit.  As we have seen,
the Chinese state has historically played an important role in determining
the cost of capital and identifying those sectors of the economy to which
this capital should be allocated.  State-owned financial institutions are also
the dominant providers of credit to the Chinese economy.  At the same
time, however, over the course of the past thirty-five years, Chinese policy-
makers have undertaken an ambitious set of reforms designed to incre-
mentally liberalize China’s financial system.218  These reforms have
included the establishment of the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges,
the permitted entry of foreign-qualified financial institutions, the partial
equitization of China’s SOCBs, and the gradual relaxation of its managed
interest and exchange rate regimes.  China is thus an archetypal example of
a ‘hybrid’ financial system, combining features of both a centralized ‘com-
mand-and-control’ and a liberalized ‘market-oriented’ model.
The hybridity of WMPs, however, ultimately manifests itself in a far
more subtle way.  As described above, there are two basic varieties of
WMPs: those which guarantee the return of investors’ principal (represent-
ing approximately 37% of the market), and those which do not (represent-
ing the other 63%).219  WMPs are also issued and guaranteed by financial
institutions with varying degrees of creditworthiness, and backed by assets
of varying levels of quality.220  Curiously, however, despite these obvious
differences in terms of their contractual entitlements and underlying risks,
significant anecdotal evidence exists to suggest that investors have not
always clearly differentiated between these ostensibly heterogeneous
products.221
218. See, e.g., Franklin Allen, Jun Qian, Meijun Qian & Mengxin Zhao, A Review of
China’s Financial System and Initiatives for the Future, in CHINA’S EMERGING FINANCIAL
MARKETS (James Barth, John Tatom, and Gleen Yago eds., 2009); John Macmillan &
Barry Naughton, How to Reform a Planned Economy: Lessons from China, 8 OX. REV.
ECON. POL. 130 (1992).
219. See supra text accompanying notes 165– 66.
220. That is, if they are backed by any assets at all. See supra notes 173, 197, and
accompanying text.
221. See Wealth Products Threaten China Banks on Ponzi-Scheme Risk, BLOOMBERG, July
16, 2013, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-07-15/wealth-products-threaten-
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One potential explanation for this apparent disconnect resides in the
widespread public perception that, should a WMP ‘fail,’222 the Chinese
government would intervene— in the interests of maintaining social stabil-
ity— to ensure that the bank that structured and marketed the product com-
pensated investors.223  This perception is partly a product of the
influential role of the government in the ownership and governance struc-
tures of SOCBs and many other financial institutions.  The government
also has a reputation for bailing out banks in financial distress.224  Thus,
as one analyst has put it: “Investors don’t care about the underlying
[assets].  They think everything is backed by the government.”225  Insofar
as this perception is accurate, of course, such public intervention would
effectively reprioritize the claims of WMP investors vis-a`-vis a bank’s other
creditors.226  Indeed, even if this perception is not accurate, it seems that
the shadow of such intervention has already had the effect of minimizing
the importance of formal contractual entitlements as the basis for investor
decision-making and, potentially, the pricing of these products.  In this
respect, the legal construction of WMPs can be seen as very much in ten-
china-banks-on-ponzi-scheme-risk.html; Soh & Flaherty, supra note 169; Wealth Manage-
ment Products Yield ‘Not Guaranteed,’ supra note 199.  Unfortunately, the size of the mar-
ket, the contractual heterogeneity of the products, and the historical lack of product-level
transparency make a more rigorous empirical examination of this issue difficult at this
point in time.  One potentially significant upshot of the proposed registration and
reporting requirements, therefore, is that they would enable us to determine with greater
certainty how investors are pricing the risks associated with ostensibly different
products.
222. What constitutes ‘failure’ in this context is of course an interesting and impor-
tant question.  Is it the failure of a WMP to pay out the marketed rate of return (irrespec-
tive of whether investors have a contractual entitlement to receive it)?  Or is it, more
narrowly, the failure of a WMP to perform its contractual obligations?
223. See Li, supra note 11. This perception is frequently reflected in news reports
about WMPs. See, e.g., Danger and Opportunity, CHINA ECON. REV., Feb. 6, 2013, http://
www.chinaeconomicreview.com/danger-opportunity; Gabriel Wildau, Chinese Bank
Wealth Management Products Boom –  Report, REUTERS, July 16, 2012, http://uk.reuters
.com/assets/print?aid=UKL4E8IG1U920120716; Wealth Products Threaten China Banks
on Ponzi-Scheme Risk, supra note 222; Sender, supra note 169; Soh & Flaherty, supra
note 169.  Charlene Chu of Fitch Ratings, meanwhile, offers a slightly different take on
the pressures on banks to make investors whole: “Our view is that banks have very
limited room to impose losses on investors if the products go bad, in large part become
the disclosure is poor.  In many cases, the precise assets are never disclosed, so the bank
has no way to prove to investors that the assets are non-performing.” Naomi Rovnik, The
Huge and Growing Subprime Debt Time-bomb Sitting Inside China’s Banks, QUARTZ, Nov.
1, 2012, http://qz.com/22190/chinese-banks-are-a-good-investment-again-their-sub-
prime-debt-exposure-is-getting-bigger/.  Along a similar vein, consistent with Allen,
Qian, and Qian’s thesis, banks might also look to make investors whole for reputational
reasons. See generally Allen et al., supra note 21.
224. Perhaps most prominently, the government undertook a RMB1.4 trillion bailout
in 1999– 2000 to repackage and remove non-performing loans from the balance sheets
of the Agricultural Bank of China, Bank of China, China Construction Bank, and Indus-
trial & Commercial Bank of China.  A similar bailout was undertaken in 2004– 2005.
For an overview of these bailouts, see MARTIN, supra note 4, at 29– 31.
225. Sender, supra note 169.
226. This assumes, of course, that the state will not bail out all of a bank’s creditors.
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sion with their essential hybridity.  Importantly, this hybridity also serves
to mask these markets’ inherent hierarchy.
C. The Inherent Hierarchy of WMPs
In a world where the vast majority of WMPs pay out as expected— i.e.
where failures are infrequent and uncorrelated— any implicit government
backstop would be highly credible.227  We might expect the credibility of
this backstop, in turn, to be reflected in relatively tight spreads vis-a`-vis the
expected rates of return on different products.  At the same time, individ-
ual banks might be driven by reputational or other considerations to com-
pensate investors in failed products.  Importantly, these implicit public and
private guarantees would introduce the possibility that investors might be
repaid some or all of their principal— if perhaps not their expected
returns— irrespective of the risks they had originally contracted to assume.
Viewed from this perspective, these implicit guarantees would thus appear
to be inconsistent with one of LTF’s core propositions.  Specifically, insofar
as we view the retail investors who purchase the majority of WMPs as resid-
ing at the periphery of the financial system, the existence of these implicit
backstops would seem to contradict the assertion that the law is more elas-
tic at the system’s apex.
It is in a world where the failure of WMPs is correlated, however, that
the inherent hierarchy of finance is likely to reveal itself.  At $USD2.13
trillion, WMPs represent almost 10% of the total assets in the Chinese
banking system and approximately 26% of China’s 2012 GDP.228  Given
China’s relatively low debt-to-GDP ratio, it is perhaps likely that the Chi-
nese government could credibly commit at this point in time to provide
large scale liquidity and other support in the event of widespread disrup-
tion within the market for WMPs.  Should this market continue to increase
in both size and interconnectedness, however, there will inevitably reach a
point at which neither market participants nor the state can credibly com-
mit to backstop all of the relevant financial claims.  Should this tipping
point be reached, of course, hard choices would need to be made about
which market participants to protect and which to leave exposed to market
forces and, potentially, to let fail.
227. Interestingly, a small number of WMPs have actually ‘failed’.  These include a
RMB160 million product created by Zhongding Wealth Investment Centre and marketed
by Huaxia Bank, which failed to repay investors both their principal and the marketed
returns upon its maturity in December 2012.  Investors in the Huaxia product were
eventually repaid their principal by the product’s guarantor. See Daniel Ren, Guarantor
Repays Principal on Failed Huaxia Product, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST, Jan. 23, 2013,
http://www.scmp.com/print/business/banking-finance/article/1133906/guarantor-re
pays-principal-failed-huaxia-product.
228. Bulletin on the Preliminary Verification Data of GDP in 2012, NATIONAL BUREAU OF
STATISTICS OF CHINA, (Sept. 2, 2013), http://www.stats.gov.con/english/pressrelease/
201309/t20130903_454864.html; Michelle Caruso-Cabrera, Why China May Be Facing A
US-Style Credit Crunch, CNBC BUS. INSIDER, Dec. 19, 2012,  http://www.businessinsider
.com/china-faces-a-us-style-credit-crunch-2012-12.
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So who, then, is likely to get a seat on the lifeboat?  Given its majority
ownership stakes, the Chinese government would almost certainly inter-
vene to support SOCBs and, by extension, investors in WMPs structured
and marketed by these institutions.  Less clear, however, is whether the
government would have either the capacity or incentives to support, for
example, the private joint-stock commercial banks which ultimately
represent a far less important source of public and private financing (see
Figure 2).229  Indeed, this may be particularly problematic given that it is
precisely these mid-tier, joint-stock commercial banks which are most
heavily reliant on WMPs as a source of financing.230  It is similarly unclear
whether the government could intervene to support China’s vast network
of city commercial banks, rural banks, and cooperatives.231  The banking
system itself, meanwhile, would seem likely to support its more economi-
cally and politically powerful counterparties— namely, other SOEs and
financial institutions.  We would thus expect to observe a discernable pat-
tern— a pecking order— during periods of market turmoil, with the market
participants closest to the center of China’s economic and political system
most likely to see their survival constraints relaxed through public or pri-
vate intervention.
D. WMPs as a Source of Financial Instability
We are thus left with an important question: why might the failure of
WMPs be highly correlated?  It is here that the interaction of public law
and regulation and private contractual structures in creating the conditions
for and triggering financial instability is most clearly evident.  As described
above, the driving force behind the emergence and growth of the market for
WMPs has been the desire to circumvent the reserve requirements, credit
quotas, minimum loan-to-deposit ratio, and ceiling on deposit rates
imposed on regulated banks.  This desire is reflected in a common legal
and economic structure characterized by the use of legally separate fund
pools as off-balance sheet financing vehicles and the resulting reliance on
wholesale funding and the issuance of new WMPs as sources of funding
liquidity.232  It is also reflected in the fact that many WMPs channel inves-
tors’ capital into relatively illiquid asset classes such as loans and commer-
cial real estate.  In this way, the law can be understood as having
incentivized market participants to both utilize a common legal and eco-
229. We might expect foreign banking subsidiaries, meanwhile, to be even less likely
to receive state support.
230. Fitch, for example, estimates that as of Q1 2013 the WMPs structured and mar-
keted by joint-stock commercial banks represented approximately 25-30% of their total
deposits.  The equivalent figures for SOCBs, the top 30 city commercial banks and rural
banks, in contrast, were in the range of 10– 15%. FITCH RATINGS, supra note 17.
231. On the one hand, like joint-stock commercial banks, these other institutions
make up a relatively small proportion of the overall market. See supra Figure 2.  On the
other hand, however, agriculture, and by extension rural financial institutions, have
often enjoyed considerable protection from the Chinese government.
232. See supra notes 192– 193 and accompanying text.
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nomic structure and pursue what may ultimately be highly correlated
investment strategies.
Crucially, the legal and economic structure of WMPs renders these
products particularly vulnerable to changes in market confidence.  In
states of the world where investors have a high level of confidence that
WMPs will be able to meet their obligations, we would expect them to con-
tinue to invest in these products in large numbers and, upon maturity, rein-
vest (or ‘rollover’) some or all of their capital into new WMPs.233  In
contrast, in states of the world where there exists a material degree of
uncertainty— whether regarding the value of the assets underlying these
products, the creditworthiness of their implicit or explicit guarantors, or
the health of the financial system more generally— we would expect inves-
tors to respond by demanding a higher yield on new WMPs.  We would
also expect counterparties within wholesale funding markets to demand
higher haircuts on posted collateral.234  Where this uncertainty was suffi-
ciently acute, meanwhile, we would expect investors and counterparties to
exercise their legal prerogative and refuse to rollover their capital into new
WMPs/repurchase agreements, thereby precipitating the withdrawal of
liquidity from the marketplace.  Viewed from this perspective, WMPs are
thus susceptible to the same crises of confidence that reside at the heart of
both traditional bank runs and the run on wholesale funding markets that
was at the epicenter of the recent financial crisis.235
The withdrawal of liquidity from these markets would put significant
pressure on the funding liquidity of existing WMPs.  The banks that spon-
sored these products, in turn, would face a limited number of options for
relieving this pressure.  First, they could liquidate assets in the relevant
fund pools.  As we have seen, however, a significant proportion of these
assets may be in the form of illiquid, hard to value investments in commer-
cial real estate, private equity, and loans to SMEs and local govern-
ments.236  Where banks seek to liquidate more marketable securities,
meanwhile, correlated selling by a large number of WMPs all facing the
same liquidity pressures could conceivably have a destabilizing impact on
prices.237  It might also generate a pernicious negative feedback loop
between funding and market liquidity.  Second, sponsoring banks might be
compelled— either by contractual guarantees or reputational considera-
tions— to step in and compensate investors.  This, of course, would shift
these liabilities back on to bank balance sheets, thereby raising potential
concerns about the liquidity and perhaps even the solvency of these institu-
233. This is assuming, of course, that the applicable regulatory regime remains static
and that more desirable substitutes do not emerge.
234. See Gary Gorton & Andrew Metrick, Haircuts, 92 FED. RES. BANK ST. LOUIS REV.
507, 510 (2010).
235. See Diamond & Rajan, supra note 20. See also Gorton & Metrick, supra note 85,
at 433.
236. See Li, supra note 11, at 2.
237. In this respect, it bears emphasizing that the market for WMPs is roughly two-
thirds the combined market capitalization of the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock
exchanges.
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tions.  Finally, sponsoring banks could let WMPs fail.  These failures, how-
ever, might then trigger a form of ‘informational contagion’238 as investors
withdraw from markets and institutions viewed as utilizing similar legal
and economic structures or pursuing similar investment strategies.  There
are thus no shortage of ways in which a disruption within WMP and whole-
sale funding markets could ultimately lead to broader financial instability.
Ultimately, of course, it is not the case that even widespread disrup-
tion within WMP or wholesale funding markets would inevitably lead to
broader financial instability.  First, as described above, the Chinese govern-
ment will, in many states of the world, possess the resources— if not always
the incentives— to provide liquidity and other support to these markets and
institutions.  Second, one might reasonably question whether such disrup-
tion is likely to have an adverse impact on the liquidity or solvency of spon-
soring banks.  Perhaps most importantly, insofar as the liquidity
withdrawn from these markets is simply deposited in investors’ bank
accounts, this would actually seem to bolster the balance sheets of these
institutions.  As The Economist put it: “The result would be a run to the
banks, not a run on them.”239  A potential problem nevertheless arises,
however, once we consider the inherent hierarchy of the Chinese financial
system.  Specifically, investors and counterparties may rationally respond
to uncertainty by shifting deposits from banks perceived to be less likely to
receive state support— many of which, as we have seen, rely disproportion-
ately on WMPs as a source of short-term funding— to those banks, namely
SOCBs, that are perceived to be the mostly likely to survive widespread
market disruption.  In the event such a shift takes place, the net effect
would be the large-scale withdrawal of liquidity from the periphery of the
Chinese financial system.
So what can we take away from this examination of the law and
finance of WMPs?  First, WMPs are not an innovation born of uncon-
strained market forces, but of the largely artificial demand generated by the
restrictive regulatory regime governing Chinese banks.
Second, the Chinese state plays an important— if often implicit— role in
backstopping these markets.  As financial crises past and present clearly
illustrate, this role is not unique to ‘socialist’ economies.  Rather, this
hybridity is an essential feature of modern financial systems.  This hybrid-
ity, in turn, has the effect of obscuring the inherent hierarchy of these sys-
tems during periods of relative stability.  During periods of acute
uncertainty, however, this hierarchy is likely to reassert itself, thereby leav-
ing the periphery of the Chinese financial system exposed to potential
instability.
Importantly, this examination also offers us two potentially valuable
insights into the relationship between the core propositions of LTF.  First, it
238. See Viral V. Acharya & Tanju Yorulmazer, Information Contagion and Bank Herd-
ing, 40 J. MONEY, CREDIT AND BANKING 215 (2008).
239. China’s Shadow Banks: The Credit Kulaks, supra note 160.
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points to a possible tension between the legal construction of financial
markets and their essential hybridity.  Specifically, as evidenced by the rel-
atively narrow spreads between ostensibly different WMPs, it suggests that
implicit government backstops may undermine the relevance of formal
contractual terms as the basis for investor decision-making.  Second, it
points to the fact that it is precisely this hybridity that enables us to relax
the survival constraints of market participants— and thus, practically
speaking, the full force of both public regulation and private contractual
commitments— with a view to preventing or containing financial instabil-
ity.240  Viewed from this perspective, the key question then becomes one of
how to design institutional arrangements— ’safety valves’— that serve this
purpose while simultaneously minimizing the prospect of moral hazard.
Lastly, we might ask ourselves whether we need LTF to generate any of
these insights.  Technically speaking, of course, the answer is clearly no.
For example, we might view WMPs as simply a form of regulatory arbitrage
that exploits the inherent incompleteness of the regulatory regime gov-
erning Chinese banks.241  We might similarly view the potential for finan-
cial instability arising from the widespread use of WMPs as little more than
a specific instance of the more general coordination problem afflicting
banks, wholesale funding markets, and other fragile markets and institu-
tions.242  And yet it is both curious and lamentable that these more conven-
tional frameworks were not widely used by scholars or policymakers
during the run-up to the financial crisis to warn us of the gathering storm.
One of the most important reasons for this was, ultimately, that prevailing
theoretical frameworks implicitly discounted the importance of uncer-
tainty, liquidity, and the endogenous role of the law in both shaping the
structure of the financial system and contributing to the build-up of sys-
temic risk.  Viewed in this light, the value derived from examining this case
study through the lens of LTF stems from the fact that it places these vari-
ables front and center.
V. Policy Implications
This is not a conventional policy Article.  It does not advocate the
adoption of a specific policy prescription that would assist Chinese regula-
tors in ameliorating the risks generated by the widespread use of WMPs.
The reasons for this are twofold.  First, WMPs perform a number of eco-
nomically useful functions, including both providing investors with a mar-
ket-based rate of return on their savings and channeling these savings into
the real economy.  In an environment where state intervention distorts
market signals, WMPs can also be seen as providing market participants
with valuable information about the private cost of capital.243  At present,
240. Ultimately, this second insight is essentially the inverse of the first.
241. See Fleischer, supra note 109.
242. See Diamond & Dybvig, supra note 20; Gorton & Metrick, supra note 85.
243. In this respect, WMPs can actually be viewed as a useful element of China’s
transition to a market-based interest rate regime. See Tri Vi Dang, Honglin Wang, Aidan
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there is simply insufficient evidence to determine whether the risks that
WMPs pose to investors and to the broader financial stability outweigh
these important benefits.  Indeed, these benefits likely explain why the Chi-
nese government has not intervened more quickly or forcefully to regulate
this market.  Second, and perhaps more importantly, the dynamic, struc-
turally interdependent relationship between law and finance would almost
inevitably lead to the emergence of new financial markets and institutions
designed to circumvent these policies.  Articulating policy prescriptions in
response to each new round of financial innovation thus would be to chase
Alice down the proverbial rabbit hole.
Nevertheless, there are a number of important policy implications that
flow from our examination of the relationship between law and finance in
the Chinese shadow banking industry.  As a preliminary matter, this explo-
ration suggests that the CBRC’s proposed disclosure rules, while perhaps
necessary as an exercise in political optics, are unlikely to have the desired
effect.  From an investor protection standpoint, prospective purchasers are
unlikely to possess powerful incentives to read and understand the relevant
disclosure so long as they perceive these products as being backed by an
implicit government guarantee.  From a financial stability standpoint,
meanwhile, the proposed disclosure rules and asset restrictions— limiting
the proportion of certain illiquid assets to 35% of total assets under man-
agement— will likely be ineffective at preventing the withdrawal of liquidity
during periods of acute market uncertainty.  Even after these reforms are
implemented, WMPs will still be permitted to invest a significant propor-
tion of their capital in illiquid, hard-to-value assets.  The resulting opacity—
combined with the sheer number of products, their heterogeneity, and the
complex balance sheets of the banks and other institutions that sponsor
them— suggest that this market will still be vulnerable to instability trig-
gered by the convergence of fundamental uncertainty and liquidity
constraints.
This inherent potential for financial instability, in turn, highlights the
important role of central banks in providing backstop liquidity.244  It is
this central bank liquidity, after all, that relaxes market participants’ liquid-
ity— and thus survival— constraints during periods of uncertainty.  This
observation has important implications in terms of the PBOC’s current
strategy for attempting to rein in the growth of WMPs.  In June 2013, the
PBOC made the controversial decision not to intervene to provide liquidity
support to the Chinese money market following a spike in interbank lend-
ing rates.245  This decision was widely interpreted as the PBOC’s attempt
Yao, Chinese Shadow Banking: Bank-Centric Misperceptions (Hong Kong Inst. for Mone-
tary Research, Working Paper No. 22, 2014).
244. This liquidity can be provided in the form of open market operations, transac-
tions within the repo market, or targeted support to individual financial institutions.
245. See George Magnus, China’s Ponzi Credit Boom Faces Crunch, FIN. TIMES, June 24,
2013, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/db5c83dc-da67-11e2-8062-
00144feab7de.html#axzz3ItARZWZR; Simon Rabinovitch, PBoC Dashes Hopes of China
Liquidity Boost, FIN. TIMES, June 20, 2013, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/d244210c-d8ae-
11e2-a6cf-00144feab7de.html#axzz3ItARZWZR.
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to fire a warning shot across the bow of commercial banks regarding the
risks arising from an over-reliance on short-term credit— including WMPs—
as a source of financing.246  It may have also been designed as a ‘real time’
stress test, enabling the PBOC to identify the banks most vulnerable to a
potential liquidity crisis.
Whatever the underlying rationale, the effect of this strategy was to
exacerbate uncertainty within an already uncertain marketplace.  Interbank
borrowing costs— as measured by seven-day repo rates— peaked at 11.62%
on June 20, or roughly three times higher than their historical average.247
The benchmark Shanghai Composite Index fell by over 13% in June, and
by almost 9% the week of June 17– 24 alone.248  Remarkably, the PBOC
pursued a similar strategy in October and again in December 2013, each
time with broadly similar (if somewhat less pronounced) effects.249  In the
end, the lesson from these experiments in brinkmanship seems abun-
dantly clear: any ambiguity surrounding the provision of central bank
liquidity during periods of market turmoil carries with it a significant risk
of instability.250
As the provision of central bank liquidity becomes more certain, of
course, so too does the threat of moral hazard.  Indeed, this is essentially
the problem that the PBOC was attempting to ameliorate by withdrawing
its support for the interbank market.  Given the stakes, however, the opti-
mal strategy is not to take away the punch bowl once the party gets out of
hand; rather, it is to promote greater sobriety by ensuring that all of the
parts of the financial system that perform economically equivalent func-
tions are, to the fullest extent possible, subject to functionally equivalent
246. See Properly Adjust Liquidity and Maintain the Stability of the Money Market, PEO-
PLE’S BANK OF CHINA (June 26, 2013), available at http://www.pbc.gov.cn/image_public/
UserFiles/english/upload/File/%E5%90%88%E7%90%86%E8%B0%83%E8%8A%
82%E6%B5%81%E5%8A%A8%E6%80%A7.pdf. See also Simon Rabinovitch, PBoC
Plays Hard Ball over Cash Crunch, FIN. TIMES, June 24, 2013, http://www.ft.com/intl/
cms/s/0/fd8e8f4c-dc86-11e2-8853-00144feab7de.html#axzz3ItARZWZR; Lingling Wei
& Bob Davis, Inside China’s Bank-Rate Missteps, WALL ST. JOURNAL, July 2, 2013, http://
online.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324251504578579292237914344.
247. Wei & Davis, supra note 247.
248. SSE Composite Index, YAHOO FIN. (last visited Nov. 14, 2014), http://
finance.yahoo.com/q/hp?s=000001.SS&a=05&b=1&c=2013&d=05&e=30&f=2013
&g=d.
249. See Jamil Anderlini, China Rates Stable But Concerns Remain, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 26,
2013, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/f854192a-6e1c-11e3-8dff-00144feabdc0.
html#axzz3ItARZWZR.
250. It is debatable at this point whether the PBOC has in fact learned this crucial
lesson.  On the one hand, the PBOC intervened in both October and December 2013 to
provide liquidity in response to a spike in interbank lending rates.  On the other hand,
however, it has continued its policy of occasionally refraining from engaging in open
market operations as a means of curbing banks’ reliance on short term credit. See Simon
Rabinovitch, Anxiety over China Liquidity Levels Lingers, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 25, 2013, http:/
/www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/1db74a22-3d2e-11e3-86ef-00144feab7de.html#axzz3ItAR
ZWZR; Simon Rabinovitch, PBoC Acts to Ease China Cash Crunch Fears, FIN. TIMES, Dec.
19, 2013, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/5162c822-6896-11e3-996a-00144feabdc
0.html#axzz3ItARZWZR.
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forms of prudential regulation.251  Whether such functional equivalence is
possible as a practical matter is an important and contested question.  This
contestability, however, does not detract from the essential role of central
banks as lenders and dealers of last resort.  Once again, the key question
becomes how to design institutional safety valves which effectively balance
the competing interests of giving central banks the flexibility to perform
their vital function as crisis ‘fire fighters’ while simultaneously incentiviz-
ing market participants not to play with fire.
Finally, this examination provides us with a deeper understanding of
the potential sources of financial instability.  Perhaps most importantly, it
suggests that the financial markets and institutions that emerge in
response to changes in public law and regulation— especially those laws
and regulations designed to constrain socially excessive risk-taking— merit
heightened regulatory scrutiny.252  It is the law that spurs these innova-
tions, and the law that drives market participants to use them to channel
risk into potentially fragile parts of the financial system.  Accordingly, just
as lawyers looking to understand the economic structure of financial trans-
actions have long been told to ‘follow the money,’ policymakers looking to
understand the structure of the financial system, its determinants, and
potential sources of instability would be well advised to ‘follow the law.’
This, in turn, would enable regulators to be more proactive in identifying
potential risks and taking meaningful preventative action to ensure that
these new markets and institutions are sufficiently resilient to shocks pre-
cipitated by the convergence of fundamental uncertainty and liquidity
constraints.
Conclusion
Almost twenty years after LLSV published their groundbreaking and
controversial research, our understanding of the relationship between law
and finance is still in its theoretical infancy.  Today, few would argue that
strong laws and legal institutions do not help generate credible commit-
ments and thereby promote financial development.253  Ultimately, how-
ever, this observation is little more than a useful starting point, a
foundation for exploring the complex, dynamic, and structurally interde-
pendent relationship between law and finance in the real world.  This Arti-
cle has used LTF to explore this relationship in the context of the Chinese
shadow banking system and, specifically, the market for WMPs.  This
251. There is also a potentially important role for other forms of regulatory interven-
tion including, inter alia, remuneration requirements, civil and criminal liability, and
structural separation.  In China, we might also look to informal enforcement via the
Communist Party’s influence over the career trajectory of senior bankers as a means of
constraining moral hazard.  Lamentably, the relative merits and drawbacks of these and
other forms of regulatory intervention are beyond the scope of this Article.
252. Imagine, for example, what might have been if regulators had more closely moni-
tored the securitization structures that emerged as a response to the implementation of
Basel II? See Jones, supra note 79, at 49.
253. Pistor, supra note 46, at 2.
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emerging theory provides us with a useful framework for understanding
the legal construction of WMPs, their essential hybridity and inherent hier-
archy, and the risks they pose to financial instability.  More broadly, exam-
ining WMPs through the lens of LTF highlights the fact that, far from
simply representing the ‘rules of the game,’ the law is also often the board,
the game pieces, and the dice.
Simultaneously, this Article raises far more questions than it provides
answers.  As a preliminary matter, there is ample scope for further empiri-
cal research into the detailed legal structure of WMPs, how variations in
this structure across different products influence price and, as a corollary,
the nature and extent of the Chinese state’s implicit backstop of these prod-
ucts.  There is also the question of how WMPs will evolve in response to
new regulatory requirements.  Finally, there are important questions sur-
rounding how to design functionally equivalent regulatory regimes for dif-
ferent markets and institutions and, on the assumption that it is neither
feasible nor desirable for these regimes to eliminate all risk from within the
financial system, the regulatory safety valves that define the circumstances
in which central banks may intervene in the interests of maintaining finan-
cial stability.  We conclude, therefore, where we began— with a great many
dragons left to slay.
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